CVE-2026-103102 in Infinity
Summary
by MITRE • 09/30/2026
Pexip Infinity before 41.0 is affected by improper input validation in the signaling implementation which allows a remote attacker to trigger a software abort resulting in a denial of service. Exploitation of this issue requires accessing a gateway call from a WebRTC/API client.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/30/2026
The vulnerability identified in Pexip Infinity versions prior to 41.0 represents a critical flaw within the signaling implementation, specifically categorized under CWE-20 as Improper Input Validation. This defect arises when the application fails to adequately sanitize or verify incoming data structures before processing them for call setup and management operations. The core technical issue lies in the handling of specific signaling messages that are expected from WebRTC clients or API-driven endpoints. When a remote attacker crafts a maliciously formatted request containing invalid, malformed, or unexpectedly structured input parameters, the application's internal logic encounters an unrecoverable state during parsing or validation routines. Instead of gracefully rejecting the invalid data with an appropriate error code, the software triggers a fatal exception that results in a process abort. This behavior indicates a lack of robust error handling mechanisms designed to isolate and contain such anomalies without compromising the stability of the entire service instance.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability directly facilitates a Denial of Service attack against the Pexip Infinity infrastructure. Because the exploitation requires triggering a software abort, the immediate consequence is the termination of the affected process or potentially the entire signaling server depending on the deployment configuration and restart policies. This leads to a complete interruption of voice and video communication services for all users relying on that specific node. The impact extends beyond simple downtime; it can cause cascading failures if load balancing mechanisms fail to detect the unavailability of the compromised node quickly enough, potentially overwhelming other healthy nodes in the cluster with redirected traffic while they too are vulnerable or unable to handle the surge. For organizations dependent on continuous real-time communication for critical operations, such as healthcare, finance, or emergency services, this disruption can have severe business continuity implications.
The attack vector for this vulnerability is remote but requires a specific entry point: access via a gateway call from a WebRTC client or an API integration. This constraint means that the attacker must be able to establish a connection with the Pexip signaling interface and send specially crafted packets that mimic legitimate traffic patterns enough to bypass basic network-level filters, yet contain the malformed data necessary to trigger the abort condition. While this limits the scope of potential attackers compared to fully open internet-facing services without authentication, it remains significant for environments where WebRTC applications or automated API integrations are permitted through firewalls and security groups. The requirement for a gateway call implies that internal network segmentation might not provide sufficient protection if an attacker has already gained foothold within the trusted zone or if misconfigured access control lists allow external entities to reach these endpoints.
To mitigate this risk, organizations running Pexip Infinity versions earlier than 41.0 must prioritize immediate patching and upgrading to a version where the input validation logic in the signaling module has been corrected. This update should include enhanced sanitization routines that strictly enforce expected data formats and lengths before processing begins. In addition to applying vendor patches, administrators should implement strict network access controls to limit exposure of WebRTC and API endpoints to only known and trusted IP addresses or subnets. Deploying a Web Application Firewall with rules specifically tuned to detect anomalous signaling payloads can provide an additional layer of defense by blocking malformed requests before they reach the application logic. Furthermore, enabling detailed logging for signaling events allows security teams to monitor for patterns indicative of exploitation attempts, such as repeated connection failures from specific sources or unusual spikes in invalid message types, facilitating rapid incident response and forensic analysis if a breach is suspected.