CVE-2026-100570 in OpenClaw
Summary
by MITRE • 09/26/2026
OpenClaw (npm package 'openclaw') versions >= 2026.3.28 and < 2026.8.1 allow an untrusted workspace .env file to set the CLOUDSDK_PYTHON_ARGS environment variable. When an operator starts OpenClaw in attacker-controlled workspace content and then runs the Gmail setup flow, that value is inherited when gcloud is launched, and the gcloud launcher passes it as arguments to the trusted Python interpreter. A crafted CLOUDSDK_PYTHON_ARGS value can therefore cause Python to execute attacker-supplied code with the OpenClaw host user's permissions, allowing credentials to be read, files to be modified, or other processes to be started. This issue is fixed in version 2026.8.1; as a workaround, run Gmail setup only from trusted workspaces and clear inherited CLOUDSDK_* variables beforehand.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/26/2026
The vulnerability identified in OpenClaw versions greater than or equal to 2026.3.28 and less than 2026.8.1 represents a critical environment variable injection flaw that facilitates arbitrary code execution through the manipulation of external configuration files. This issue stems from an insecure handling of workspace-specific .env files, which are intended for local development convenience but lack sufficient validation when integrated into security-sensitive workflows such as Google Cloud SDK authentication and setup procedures. The core technical failure lies in the application's decision to inherit environment variables defined within these untrusted workspaces directly into the execution context of privileged system tools without sanitization or restriction. Specifically, the vulnerability allows an attacker who controls workspace content to define a CLOUDSDK_PYTHON_ARGS variable that is subsequently passed by the gcloud launcher to the underlying Python interpreter. This mechanism bypasses standard security boundaries because it treats user-supplied configuration data as executable command-line arguments for a trusted binary, effectively creating a path for remote code execution under the context of the OpenClaw host user.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability poses severe risks including unauthorized access to sensitive credentials stored in cloud profiles, modification or exfiltration of local files accessible by the executing user, and the potential establishment of persistent backdoors through arbitrary process initiation. The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it leverages legitimate administrative tools like gcloud, which are often whitelisted or trusted within organizational security policies due to their necessity for infrastructure management. By injecting malicious arguments into these tools, an attacker can exploit the trust relationship between the application and its dependencies. This aligns with CWE-89, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, as well as CWE-78, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, highlighting the failure to properly validate or escape user-controlled input before it influences system-level operations. Furthermore, this behavior reflects ATT&CK technique T1059, Command and Scripting Interpreter, where attackers use legitimate scripts and interpreters to execute malicious payloads, thereby evading detection by security tools that monitor for known malware signatures rather than anomalous command-line arguments.
The mitigation strategy involves both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary solution is to upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.8.1 or later, where the developers have addressed this insecure inheritance pattern. For environments unable to immediately patch, a critical workaround requires operators to strictly limit Gmail setup operations to trusted workspaces that are verified as free from malicious .env files. Additionally, it is advisable to explicitly clear inherited CLOUDSDK_* environment variables before initiating any cloud-related commands within OpenClaw sessions. This practice ensures that no residual or injected arguments from previous untrusted contexts influence the execution of sensitive tools. Long-term defenses should include implementing strict allowlists for permitted environment variables in security-critical applications and adopting a zero-trust approach to workspace content, ensuring that all external configurations are validated against expected formats before being integrated into privileged processes.