CVE-2026-100598 in OpenClaw
Summary
by MITRE • 09/26/2026
OpenClaw (npm package openclaw) before 2026.7.1 incorrectly binds Signal approval reactions. In affected versions, a reaction intended to resolve a structured approval request could instead attach to ordinary outbound text when unrelated outbound messages and a pending approval are present in the same conversation. As a result, an approver's reaction to unrelated text could be interpreted as approving or denying a pending host action; the practical impact depends on the pending request, conversation timing, and the actions available to the OpenClaw process. The issue does not change the authority of correctly identified approvers. This is fixed in version 2026.7.1.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/26/2026
The vulnerability within the OpenClaw npm package prior to version 2026.7.1 represents a critical logic error in how signal approval reactions are bound and processed, specifically falling under the category of improper input validation or ambiguous state handling. In secure application design, particularly for systems managing authorization workflows, it is imperative that user inputs intended for specific actions are strictly scoped to those actions. However, this flaw allows a reaction meant to resolve one type of structured request to inadvertently attach to ordinary outbound text messages when both unrelated outbound messages and pending approvals exist within the same conversation thread. This misbinding occurs because the application fails to correctly isolate or validate the target context of the user interaction, leading to an ambiguity in intent interpretation where the system cannot reliably distinguish between a reaction directed at standard chat content versus one directed at a specific approval workflow.
From a technical perspective, this flaw enables an attacker who can influence conversation contents or timing to manipulate the authorization state of the OpenClaw process. By ensuring that unrelated outbound messages are present alongside pending host actions, an approver's simple emoji reaction intended for casual communication could be misinterpreted by the backend logic as a formal approval or denial of a sensitive operation. This mechanism aligns with CWE-841 Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow and CWE-923 Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts if it were related to brute force, but more accurately fits CWE-602 Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Access Control or CWE-755 Improper Handling of Unexpected State. The core issue is the failure to enforce strict binding between a user action and its intended target object, allowing state confusion that bypasses the logical controls designed to protect host actions from unauthorized execution.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is contingent upon the specific permissions granted to the OpenClaw process and the nature of the pending requests available in the conversation. If an attacker can predict or control which approval request is pending at a given moment, they could potentially trick an authorized approver into inadvertently approving malicious host actions such as file system modifications, network connections, or command executions that would otherwise require explicit confirmation. This effectively allows for privilege escalation through social engineering combined with technical exploitation of the binding flaw. The attacker does not need to compromise credentials but rather exploits the trust placed in the approval mechanism by misdirecting it via conversation context manipulation.
This behavior also maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, specifically regarding the misuse of legitimate authentication and authorization processes. By leveraging valid approver interactions, an adversary can achieve unauthorized access or modification without triggering typical security alerts associated with credential theft. The severity is further amplified by the fact that the vulnerability does not alter the authority levels themselves but rather subverts the decision-making process at the point of execution approval. This means that even highly privileged accounts remain secure in terms of identity, but their operational decisions can be hijacked through this contextual ambiguity.
Mitigation for this issue requires immediate upgrade to version 2026.7.1 or later, where the binding logic has been corrected to ensure reactions are strictly associated with their intended approval requests and do not bleed into general message handling routines. In environments where upgrading is temporarily delayed, administrators should implement strict conversational protocols that separate approval workflows from casual chat threads entirely. This could involve using distinct channels for operational approvals versus general communication or implementing additional confirmation steps that require explicit command syntax rather than relying solely on emoji reactions. Furthermore, logging and monitoring systems should be configured to flag any reaction events that occur in conversations with mixed message types to detect potential exploitation attempts of this logic flaw before they result in unauthorized host actions.