CVE-2026-102879 in ClaraVerse
Summary
by MITRE • 09/29/2026
ClaraVerse through 0.3.1 contains server-side request forgery protection bypasses in the download_file and scrape_web agent tools. Authenticated users can bypass hostname validation and IPv6 transition address filtering to make the server request internal services and cloud instance metadata endpoints.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/29/2026
The vulnerability identified in ClaraVerse versions through 0.3.1 represents a critical security flaw within its core agent functionality, specifically affecting the download_file and scrape_web tools. This issue is classified as a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) protection bypass, which allows authenticated users to manipulate outbound network requests initiated by the server itself. Unlike client-side SSRF where an attacker tricks a user into making a request, this variant exploits the trust relationship between the application backend and internal infrastructure services. The flaw stems from insufficient validation logic within these specific agent tools, failing to adequately restrict the destinations that can be accessed via HTTP or HTTPS protocols.
The technical root cause lies in the failure of hostname validation mechanisms and IPv6 transition address filtering. When a user provides a target URL for download or web scraping operations, the application is supposed to verify whether the destination falls within an allowed list of external domains. However, due to implementation errors, attackers can craft malicious payloads that evade these checks. By leveraging specific encoding techniques or protocol variations, it becomes possible to bypass hostname restrictions. Furthermore, the IPv6 transition address filtering mechanism, designed to prevent access to local loopback addresses and private IP ranges through mapped IPv4 representations such as 127.0.0.1 in IPv6 format (e.g., ::ffff:127.0.0.1), is also circumvented. This allows the server to resolve and connect to internal network resources that should remain inaccessible from external or untrusted contexts.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly for deployments running ClaraVerse in cloud environments or on-premises networks with sensitive internal services. An authenticated attacker can utilize these bypassed agent tools to probe internal network segments, discover hidden services, and exfiltrate data from unprotected endpoints. A primary target for such attacks is the cloud instance metadata endpoint, commonly found at addresses like 169.254.169.254 in AWS or similar ranges in other providers. Accessing these endpoints can lead to the compromise of temporary security credentials, IAM roles, and other sensitive configuration data stored by the operating system for instance management. This information is often used as a stepping stone for lateral movement within the cloud environment, potentially leading to full account takeover or unauthorized access to storage buckets and database instances.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-918, which describes Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaws where server-side code makes requests based on user-supplied input without proper validation of the destination address. Additionally, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1504.003, specifically Cloud Instance Metadata API, as attackers leverage SSRF to access metadata services for credential harvesting. The ability to bypass IPv6 transition filters also highlights a common oversight in network security controls known as CWE-289, which relates to authentication by IP address restriction being bypassed through alternative addressing schemes.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust server-side request validation frameworks that enforce strict allow-listing of permitted domains and protocols. It is essential to ensure that all outbound requests are validated against a comprehensive list of allowed hostnames before any network connection is attempted. Furthermore, developers should implement deep inspection for IPv6 transition addresses, ensuring that representations like ::ffff:127.0.0.1 or other mapped private ranges are explicitly blocked alongside standard loopback and private IP blocks. Network-level controls such as egress filtering at the firewall or proxy level can provide an additional layer of defense by restricting outbound traffic to only known external destinations. For organizations still running affected versions, upgrading to a patched release is the primary remediation step, while interim mitigations should include disabling the download_file and scrape_web agent tools if they are not strictly required for business operations.