CVE-2026-104585 in Mobile Security Framework
Summary
by MITRE • 10/13/2026
Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) v4.5.2 is vulnerable to Command Injection in /download_data/, /api/v1/scan, Dynamic Analyzer ADB integration module.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/13/2026
The Mobile Security Framework version 4.5.2 contains a critical command injection vulnerability that affects multiple components of the application, specifically within the data download endpoint, the scanning API interface, and the Android Debug Bridge integration module used for dynamic analysis. This flaw arises from insufficient sanitization or validation of user-supplied input before it is passed to underlying system commands. In web applications like MobSF, which serve as a comprehensive platform for automated mobile application security testing, such vulnerabilities are particularly severe because they allow an attacker with access to the interface to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the host machine running the framework. The vulnerability manifests in three distinct areas: the /download_data/ endpoint likely fails to properly escape arguments when constructing shell commands to retrieve or process files; the /api/v1/scan API endpoint may pass unvalidated parameters directly into command-line invocations for initiating scans; and the Dynamic Analyzer ADB integration module, which communicates with Android devices via the adb tool, appears to mishandle device identifiers or other input data, leading to unintended command execution.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-78, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly known as OS Command Injection. The root cause typically involves the use of unsafe functions such as system(), exec(), or passthru() in Python scripts without adequate input filtering. When a user provides maliciously crafted input containing shell metacharacters like semicolons, ampersands, or pipe symbols, these characters can break out of the intended command context and execute subsequent commands defined by the attacker. For instance, if an attacker submits a device ID ending with ; rm -rf / to the ADB module, the resulting system call might delete critical files on the server hosting MobSF. Similarly, injection into the scan API could allow remote code execution during the initialization of security tests against mobile applications.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and potentially catastrophic for organizations relying on MobSF for their application security testing pipelines. An attacker who can exploit this flaw gains the ability to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) with the privileges of the user account running the MobSF service, which is often root or a high-privilege administrative account in containerized or server environments. This level of access enables full compromise of the underlying infrastructure, including theft of sensitive data processed by the framework, such as proprietary mobile application binaries and their associated security reports containing vulnerability details. Furthermore, attackers can use the compromised system as a pivot point to launch attacks against other internal network resources, leading to broader organizational breaches. The presence of this flaw in both static analysis APIs and dynamic ADB integration modules means that any authenticated user or potentially unauthenticated users if authentication is misconfigured could trigger these injection vectors.
To mitigate this risk, immediate remediation steps should focus on patching the MobSF installation to a version where these command injection flaws have been addressed by the development team. In addition to updating software, organizations must implement strict input validation and parameterization techniques within any custom integrations or scripts interacting with the framework. It is crucial to avoid passing user-controlled data directly into shell commands; instead, developers should use language-specific libraries that handle argument separation safely without invoking a shell interpreter where possible. Network-level controls such as firewalls can also help by restricting access to MobSF endpoints only from trusted IP addresses and ensuring that authentication mechanisms are robustly configured to prevent unauthorized users from accessing the vulnerable APIs. Regular security audits and static code analysis of any custom extensions added to MobSF will further reduce the likelihood of similar injection vulnerabilities persisting in future deployments.