CVE-2026-104629 in openPDC
Summary
by MITRE • 10/09/2026
A component loading mechanism in openPDC and openHistorian will construct and run any specified type, which may be an invalid component to load. An attacker with an authenticated user account and the ability to place a file on the host filesystem can use this to run arbitrary constructor code, and this code runs with the privileges of the affected service account.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/09/2026
The vulnerability identified in openPDC and openHistorian represents a critical flaw within their component loading mechanisms, specifically categorized under CWE-470 which involves unsafe reflection or dynamic class instantiation without proper validation. This architectural weakness allows an attacker who has obtained authenticated access to the system and possesses write privileges to specific directories on the host filesystem to inject malicious payloads into the application's execution flow. The core issue lies in the software's design philosophy, which prioritizes flexibility by allowing the loading of arbitrary types specified via configuration files or input parameters without sufficiently verifying that these components are legitimate, safe, or intended for use within the operational context. By constructing and executing any specified type, the system inadvertently provides a vector for Remote Code Execution (RCE) when an attacker can control the target class name passed to this loading mechanism.
From an offensive security perspective, this vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically through dynamic code execution or reflection abuse. An authenticated user who can place a file on the host filesystem does not need elevated privileges initially; they only require access to write their malicious component into a location that the openPDC or openHistorian service reads from during its initialization or runtime configuration reload process. Once the attacker places a compiled class file containing malicious constructor logic in this accessible directory, and subsequently triggers the application to load it by modifying relevant configuration entries, the software will instantiate the object. The execution of the constructor code occurs within the security context of the user account under which the openPDC or openHistorian service is running. This effectively bypasses standard operating system permission boundaries because the malicious code inherits all privileges associated with that service account, often including administrative rights on Windows systems or root-like capabilities in Linux environments depending on deployment configurations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it leads to a complete compromise of the affected host and potentially the broader industrial control network if openPDC serves as a central data aggregation point for power grid monitoring. Since these components are often deployed with high-level privileges to ensure reliable access to hardware interfaces and databases, successful exploitation grants an attacker full control over the underlying operating system. This can result in unauthorized modification of critical infrastructure settings, exfiltration of sensitive operational technology (OT) data, or further lateral movement within the network by using the compromised host as a pivot point. The ability to run arbitrary code means that attackers could deploy additional malware, establish persistence mechanisms, or disrupt service availability, directly impacting the reliability and integrity of power system monitoring and historical data analysis functions.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural hardening. Immediately, organizations should apply vendor-provided patches if available, which typically involve restricting the types of classes that can be loaded to a predefined whitelist or removing the ability for end-users to specify arbitrary class names in configuration files. Access controls should be strictly enforced to ensure that only authorized administrators have write access to directories used by openPDC and openHistorian for component loading; regular users should not possess filesystem permissions that allow them to place executable artifacts in these paths. Additionally, implementing least-privilege principles is crucial; the service accounts running these applications should be configured with minimal necessary privileges, avoiding local administrator rights where possible. Network segmentation can also help contain potential damage by isolating OT systems from general corporate networks and restricting outbound connections to prevent data exfiltration or command-and-control communications following exploitation. Regular auditing of configuration files and filesystem integrity monitoring tools can aid in detecting unauthorized changes that might indicate an attempt to exploit this vulnerability before it leads to full system compromise.