CVE-2026-107807 in Nginx UI
Summary
by MITRE • 10/09/2026
Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, Nginx UI accepts the Node.Secret master credential through the node_secret query parameter in HTTP and WebSocket authentication paths instead of requiring the X-Node-Secret header. The credential can consequently appear in access logs, proxy logs, browser history, Referer headers, configuration URLs, and deployment environment data. A party that obtains the secret can bypass normal password, JWT, session, and second-factor checks and obtain persistent administrative API access, including access to configuration and secret material. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/09/2026
The vulnerability identified within Nginx UI versions ranging from 2.0.0 through 2.5.0 represents a critical misconfiguration of authentication mechanisms that leads to the exposure of sensitive master credentials and subsequent unauthorized administrative access. This flaw stems from an architectural decision where the application accepts the Node.Secret, which serves as the primary master credential for authenticating nodes within the Nginx UI ecosystem, via the node_secret query parameter in both HTTP and WebSocket authentication paths. In secure web application design, secrets such as API keys or master passwords should never be transmitted through URL parameters because these values are inherently visible to multiple parties beyond the intended recipient. Instead, credentials must be passed using mechanisms that do not leave persistent traces, such as custom HTTP headers like X-Node-Secret, which remain invisible in standard logging and browser artifacts. By relying on query string transmission, Nginx UI inadvertently violates fundamental security principles regarding the protection of authentication material.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the wide array of vectors through which the exposed secret can be captured. Because the credential appears in HTTP request URLs, it becomes susceptible to logging by intermediate infrastructure components and client-side applications. Specifically, the Node.Secret may be recorded in web server access logs, reverse proxy logs, browser history, Referer headers when navigating between pages or sites, configuration files that might log connection details, and deployment environment data where command-line arguments are often logged for debugging purposes. This pervasive exposure means that any entity with read access to these logs or network traffic captures can retrieve the master credential without needing to exploit a separate injection flaw or bypass encryption mechanisms. The presence of this secret in multiple locations significantly expands the attack surface beyond just the application layer, encompassing infrastructure monitoring tools and client-side environments.
Once an attacker obtains the Node.Secret through any of these exposure vectors, they gain the ability to completely bypass all other layers of authentication security implemented by Nginx UI. This includes password-based login forms, JSON Web Token validation mechanisms, session management controls, and even second-factor authentication checks designed to add additional verification steps. The compromised secret allows for persistent administrative API access, granting the attacker full control over the system's configuration and sensitive data stores. With this level of access, an adversary can modify server configurations, potentially disrupting service availability or redirecting traffic maliciously, extract stored secrets and certificates used by downstream services, and maintain long-term persistence within the environment without triggering typical security alerts associated with failed login attempts or unusual session behavior.
This vulnerability is best classified under CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information and CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials in Transmission, as it involves both the improper handling of credentials during transmission and their subsequent exposure through logging mechanisms that fail to sanitize sensitive data. From a tactical perspective, this aligns with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Credential Access via Unsecured Storage or Log Manipulation, where attackers leverage poor credential management practices to establish footholds. The root cause is not necessarily a complex code execution flaw but rather an insecure design pattern in the authentication protocol implementation that prioritizes convenience over security by exposing secrets in URL parameters.
To mitigate this vulnerability and prevent similar issues in future deployments, it is imperative to upgrade Nginx UI to version 2.5.0 or later where the issue has been resolved. In addition to upgrading, organizations should audit their existing logs for any instances of exposed Node.Secrets if they are running affected versions. It is also recommended to implement strict log sanitization policies that automatically redact sensitive parameters from access and proxy logs regardless of application configuration changes. Furthermore, developers should adhere to the principle of least privilege by ensuring that authentication credentials are always transmitted via secure headers rather than query strings or body content where possible, thereby minimizing the risk of accidental exposure through browser history, referer headers, or server-side logging systems.