CVE-2026-107857 in Mindwtr
Summary
by MITRE • 10/10/2026
Mindwtr is a free offline-first task management application for desktop and mobile. Prior to 1.1.5, the mobile application writes the Cloud sync bearer token and WebDAV password to unencrypted AsyncStorage under @mindwtr_cloud_token and @mindwtr_webdav_password. A party with access to the application database or an exposed device backup can recover these credentials and use them to access the user's synchronized tasks and attachments. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.5.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/10/2026
The vulnerability identified within Mindwtr versions prior to 1.1.5 represents a critical failure in data protection mechanisms for sensitive authentication credentials stored on mobile devices. As an offline-first task management application, Mindwtr relies heavily on local storage to maintain functionality without constant network connectivity. However, the implementation of cloud synchronization features introduced significant security risks due to improper handling of secrets. Specifically, the application persisted the Cloud sync bearer token and WebDAV password in unencrypted AsyncStorage under specific keys identified as mindwtr_cloud_token and mindwtr_webdav_password. This design choice violates fundamental principles of secure credential storage by treating sensitive authentication material with the same level of protection as non-sensitive configuration data. The use of unencrypted local storage means that these credentials are stored in plaintext, making them trivially accessible to any entity or process capable of reading the application's private file system on an Android device or accessing the sandboxed directory structure on iOS devices.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe because it effectively compromises the confidentiality and integrity of user data synchronized through cloud services. An attacker with physical access to a locked but compromised device, or one who has gained administrative privileges via malware or jailbreak exploits, can directly extract these plaintext credentials from the application's database files. Furthermore, the risk extends beyond direct file system access; if a user performs an unencrypted backup of their device using standard operating system tools or third-party backup utilities, the Mindwtr data directory is often included in that archive. Consequently, anyone with access to such backups can recover the bearer token and WebDAV password without needing to exploit any additional vulnerabilities on the host device. Once obtained, these credentials allow an unauthorized party to authenticate as the legitimate user against the cloud synchronization service. This enables the attacker to view all synchronized tasks, read attached files, modify existing entries, or delete critical project data, leading to a complete breach of privacy and potential business disruption for users relying on the application for professional task management.
From a technical classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-312 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information, which describes situations where sensitive information is stored without encryption. It also relates closely to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials if the storage mechanism itself was deemed insufficiently secure by design standards for mobile applications. In terms of attack vectors and tactics, this flaw facilitates lateral movement or privilege escalation in scenarios involving device theft or compromise, falling under MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Credential Access from Local Systems. The lack of encryption means that even basic forensic tools can parse the AsyncStorage JSON files or SQLite databases (depending on the underlying implementation) to extract values directly. This simplicity makes exploitation accessible to a wide range of threat actors, including opportunistic attackers who may not possess advanced reverse engineering skills but have access to device backups or rooted/jailbroken environments.
Mitigation for this vulnerability requires immediate remediation by upgrading to version 1.1.5 or later, where the developers have addressed these storage issues. For organizations deploying Mindwtr in enterprise environments, it is imperative to enforce mobile application management policies that ensure devices are encrypted at rest and backups are secured with strong encryption keys inaccessible to unauthorized users. Additionally, security awareness training should emphasize the importance of device lock screens and avoiding unencrypted cloud backup services for devices containing sensitive work applications. While upgrading resolves the immediate technical flaw, long-term resilience involves adopting secure storage patterns such as using platform-specific keystore systems like Android Keystore or iOS Keychain Service, which provide hardware-backed encryption and protect keys from extraction even if the file system is compromised. These standards ensure that cryptographic operations are performed in a trusted execution environment, preventing plaintext exposure of sensitive tokens during both storage and retrieval processes.