CVE-2026-104797 in Advanced Form Integration Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/10/2026
The Advanced Form Integration — Connect Forms to 300+ Apps plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Unverified Password Change in all versions up to, and including, 2.9.0 The `adfoin_ultimatememberac_send_data` function, which powers the Ultimate Member "Update Profile Field" action, resolves the target WordPress user from an attacker-supplied email address and passes an attacker-controlled field key and value directly to `UM()->user()->update_profile()` in the `account` context — which explicitly bypasses Ultimate Member's banned-key validation — without performing any submitter identity verification, ownership check, capability check, current-password reauthentication, or restriction on sensitive keys such as `user_pass`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the password of any WordPress user account, including Administrator accounts, by submitting a public Contact Form 7 form with a target email and `user_pass` as the field key, enabling full site takeover. Exploitation requires an administrator to have pre-configured a Contact Form 7 integration that maps the target email, field key, and value from public form inputs to the Ultimate Member Update Profile Field action — the exact workflow the plugin's own UI advertises for this action type.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/10/2026
The vulnerability identified in Advanced Form Integration versions up to 2.9.0 represents a critical authentication bypass that allows unauthenticated attackers to compromise WordPress user accounts, including those with administrative privileges. This flaw resides within the `adfoin_ultimatememberac_send_data` function, which serves as the backend handler for the Ultimate Member Update Profile Field action integrated via Contact Form 7. The core technical deficiency is a complete absence of identity verification and ownership validation when processing form submissions that target user profile updates. Specifically, the function resolves the intended victim by accepting an email address directly from attacker-supplied input without verifying that the submitter owns or controls that account. This design choice fundamentally undermines the security model of any system relying on public-facing forms for sensitive data modification.
The operational impact is severe because the plugin passes both a field key and its corresponding value, controlled entirely by the attacker, to Ultimate Member's `update_profile` function within an administrative context. Crucially, this execution path explicitly bypasses Ultimate Member’s built-in banned-key validation mechanisms that are typically designed to prevent users from modifying restricted fields such as usernames or passwords through standard profile editing interfaces. By circumventing these safeguards and lacking any requirement for current-password reauthentication or capability checks, the vulnerability enables an unauthenticated actor to overwrite sensitive attributes of arbitrary user accounts. The most dangerous application of this flaw is changing the `user_pass` field, which allows the attacker to set a new password for any target account, thereby gaining full control over that WordPress identity and potentially achieving complete site takeover if the targeted account holds administrator rights.
Exploitation of this vulnerability requires specific preconditions related to the plugin's configuration rather than arbitrary code execution on the server itself. An administrator must have previously configured a Contact Form 7 integration using the advertised workflow, which maps public form inputs directly to the Ultimate Member Update Profile Field action. This means that if a site owner has set up forms intended for legitimate user profile updates without implementing additional security layers such as CAPTCHA or strict input validation at the application level, they inadvertently expose their entire user base to this attack vector. The attacker simply needs to submit a public form containing the target email address and the field key `user_pass` along with the desired new password value. This scenario highlights a common misconfiguration pattern where convenience features are enabled without adequate consideration of authentication boundaries between unauthenticated web traffic and privileged account management operations.
From a standards perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-287 Improper Authentication, as the system fails to adequately verify the identity of the user before performing a sensitive action. It also relates to CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site in terms of trust boundaries being violated by accepting external input for critical state changes without validation. In the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this flaw facilitates Account Manipulation techniques where an adversary modifies account credentials to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges. The lack of capability checks further implicates CWE-862 Missing Authorization, as unauthenticated users are permitted to perform actions reserved for authenticated and authorized entities.
Mitigation strategies must address both the immediate configuration risks and broader architectural flaws. Administrators should immediately update the Advanced Form Integration plugin to a patched version if one is available from the vendor that enforces proper ownership verification or restricts sensitive field modifications in unauthenticated contexts. In the interim, site owners should disable any Contact Form 7 integrations that map directly to user profile updates until patches are applied. Implementing additional layers of defense such as CAPTCHA on public forms can significantly raise the barrier for automated exploitation attempts by requiring human interaction. Furthermore, enforcing strict input validation and sanitization at the application level is essential; developers should ensure that any function handling external data performs rigorous checks against banned keys like `user_pass` regardless of the calling context or framework defaults. Regular security audits focusing on authentication bypasses in form-handling logic are recommended to identify similar patterns where convenience overrides security controls.