CVE-2026-105130 in LaraDashboard
Summary
by MITRE • 10/04/2026
LaraDashboard from 1.4.0 before 1.4.8 contains a race condition vulnerability in RegisterController::register that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass the per-IP daily registration limit. Attackers can send many concurrent registration requests from one IP so all pass RegistrationGuardService::hasExceededIpLimit before recordRegistration runs, creating accounts in bulk and defeating anti-automation controls.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/04/2026
The vulnerability identified in LaraDashboard versions prior to 1.4.8 represents a critical race condition within the user registration workflow, specifically located in the RegisterController::register method. This flaw undermines the application's ability to enforce per-IP daily registration limits, which are designed as an anti-automation control to prevent spam and abuse of the sign-up process. The core issue stems from a lack of atomicity when checking for existing registrations against creating new user records. In a concurrent execution environment, multiple threads or processes originating from the same IP address can simultaneously invoke the registration endpoint. Each request independently queries the RegistrationGuardService::hasExceededIpLimit function to determine if the limit has been reached. Because this check and the subsequent database insertion are not performed within a single transactional block with appropriate locking mechanisms, there exists a time-of-check-to-time-of-use gap that allows multiple requests to pass the validation step before any of them commit their data to the database.
From a technical perspective, this is a classic example of a race condition where the state of the system changes between the verification of a precondition and the execution of the action based on that verification. The RegistrationGuardService::hasExceededIpLimit function likely reads the current count of registrations for an IP address from persistent storage or cache. If multiple requests arrive concurrently, they may all read the same low count value before any single request has incremented it via recordRegistration. Consequently, each request perceives itself as being within the allowed limit and proceeds to create a new account. This behavior effectively bypasses the intended rate limiting logic, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to generate a large volume of fake accounts from a single source IP address in a short period.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for organizations relying on LaraDashboard for user management or as part of their authentication infrastructure. The ability to create accounts in bulk can lead to resource exhaustion through database bloat and increased server load due to the processing overhead associated with account creation, such as sending welcome emails or initializing default settings. Furthermore, these fabricated accounts can be leveraged by attackers for subsequent malicious activities, including credential stuffing attacks if weak passwords are used, phishing campaigns targeting other users within the system, or gaining unauthorized access to features that require a registered user identity. The defeat of anti-automation controls also compromises the integrity of any analytics or metrics derived from legitimate user registrations, potentially skewing business intelligence data and masking genuine abuse patterns.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-362, which describes concurrent execution using shared resources with improper synchronization, leading to race conditions. It is directly related to the mechanism used in MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as it facilitates the creation of unauthorized valid accounts that can be abused for further intrusion activities. Additionally, the failure to properly enforce rate limiting touches upon aspects of CWE-352, Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), although primarily this is an abuse of functionality rather than a CSRF attack per se, specifically relating to CWE-798, Use of Hard-coded Credentials if default accounts are created, or more accurately CWE-611, Improper Restriction of XML External Entity References if the registration process involves external data processing, but most pertinently it falls under abuse of functionality and lack of input validation regarding concurrency.
To mitigate this vulnerability, developers must ensure that the check for IP-based limits and the creation of the user record are performed atomically. This can be achieved by wrapping both operations in a database transaction with appropriate isolation levels or by using distributed locking mechanisms such as Redis locks if the application is deployed across multiple instances. Alternatively, implementing idempotency keys or utilizing database-level constraints that prevent duplicate entries based on IP and time windows can help enforce these limits more robustly. Upgrading to LaraDashboard version 1.4.8 or later resolves this issue by addressing the synchronization flaws in the registration controller. Organizations should also consider implementing additional layers of defense, such as CAPTCHA challenges for suspicious traffic patterns or stricter rate limiting at the network level using Web Application Firewalls, to provide a deeper defense-in-depth strategy against automated abuse.