CVE-2026-105278 in openPDC
Summary
by MITRE • 10/09/2026
The published Docker image for openPDC includes a fixed administrative credential with no forced change on first use. An attacker with network access to the management interface can authenticate using this credential and gain full administrative control of the application.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/09/2026
The vulnerability identified in the openPDC software stems from a critical misconfiguration within its published Docker image, specifically involving hardcoded default credentials for the administrative account. This flaw represents a classic instance of insecure defaults, where sensitive authentication data is embedded directly into the deployment artifact rather than being generated dynamically or enforced to be changed upon initial setup. The absence of any mechanism forcing users to alter these credentials before granting access creates an immediate and severe security gap. In environments where openPDC is deployed via containerization, this issue is particularly dangerous because Docker images are often pulled from public registries with the assumption that they represent a secure baseline configuration. When such an image contains static administrative passwords, it effectively turns any instance of the application into a publicly accessible system unless additional external security controls are meticulously implemented by the operator.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability allows for unauthorized access through simple credential stuffing or brute-force attacks if the default password is weak, but more commonly, it facilitates immediate full compromise because the credentials are known and static. An attacker with network connectivity to the management interface of openPDC can authenticate using these pre-configured administrative credentials without needing to exploit any complex code flaws or bypass authentication mechanisms entirely. Once authenticated, the attacker gains complete control over the application, which in the context of Power System Dynamics (PSD) software like openPDC, implies the ability to manipulate real-time data streams, alter configuration settings that affect grid monitoring and stability analysis, and potentially execute arbitrary commands if further privilege escalation paths exist within the underlying container environment. This level of access can lead to significant operational disruptions in power distribution networks or industrial control systems where such software is typically deployed for phasor measurement unit (PMU) data aggregation and processing.
The impact of this vulnerability extends beyond mere unauthorized access, touching on core principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability within critical infrastructure operations. By gaining administrative privileges, an attacker can modify the behavior of openPDC to misrepresent grid conditions, inject false phasor measurements, or disrupt the flow of data essential for real-time situational awareness in power grids. This could lead to incorrect decision-making by operators relying on accurate data, potentially causing cascading failures or instability in the electrical network. Furthermore, the compromised container may serve as a pivot point for lateral movement within the internal network, allowing attackers to target other systems connected to the same infrastructure. The lack of forced credential rotation means that even if an organization is aware of the default credentials, they might fail to change them due to oversight or operational inertia, leaving the system vulnerable indefinitely until manually remediated.
To mitigate this risk, organizations must immediately audit all deployments of openPDC and ensure that any instances using the affected Docker images have their administrative passwords changed to strong, unique values. It is imperative to implement network-level access controls such as firewalls or virtual private networks (VPNs) to restrict management interface access only to authorized personnel and trusted IP ranges. Additionally, adopting a policy of never relying on default credentials in production environments is essential; security best practices dictate that all software should enforce password changes upon first login or require the provision of secure credentials during the initialization process. Regular vulnerability scanning and configuration audits should be conducted to detect such misconfigurations early. For containerized deployments, utilizing image signing and verification processes can help ensure that only trusted, properly configured images are deployed, reducing the attack surface associated with pre-configured insecure defaults.
This issue aligns closely with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, which describes the use of static authentication data in software code or configuration files. It also relates to CWE-256: Unprotected Storage of Credentials if the hardcoded password is stored in plaintext within the image layers without encryption. From an offensive security perspective, this vulnerability maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, where attackers leverage legitimate credentials that have been discovered or pre-configured with weak defaults to gain initial access and maintain persistence within a target environment. Addressing these weaknesses requires both immediate remediation of existing deployments and long-term changes in development and deployment practices to prevent the introduction of insecure defaults into production systems.