CVE-2026-105696 in Penpot
Summary
by MITRE • 10/06/2026
Penpot is an open-source design and prototyping platform. Prior to 2.18.0, the get-page RPC accepts a share-link permission object with blanket read access but does not verify that the caller-selected page-id belongs to the link's authorized pages set. An attacker with both a valid share link and the attacker's own authenticated Penpot session can retrieve the complete shape and design data of another page in the same file when its identifier is known, because get-page requires authentication. The related get-file-fragment RPC also permits share-link access without mapping fragments to authorized pages. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/06/2026
The vulnerability identified in Penpot prior to version 2.18.0 represents a critical authorization flaw within the platform's remote procedure call interface, specifically affecting the get-page and get-file-fragment endpoints. As an open-source design and prototyping tool, Penpet relies on robust access control mechanisms to ensure that users can only interact with resources they are explicitly permitted to view or edit. The core technical deficiency lies in the server-side validation logic for share-link permissions. When a client requests page data via the get-page RPC endpoint using a valid share link token, the system correctly verifies that the caller possesses some form of authorized access through the shared link. However, it fails to perform a secondary verification step to ensure that the specific page identifier requested by the attacker is actually included in the set of pages explicitly granted permission within that share-link configuration. This oversight allows an authenticated user who has been given read-only or limited access to one part of a design file to bypass those restrictions and retrieve complete shape data, vector paths, layer structures, and other proprietary design assets from any other page within the same document, provided they can guess or obtain the target page's unique identifier.
This flaw is exacerbated by the fact that both get-page and get-file-fragment RPCs require authentication but do not adequately map fragment requests to authorized pages when accessed via share links. In a typical secure implementation, even if an attacker possesses a valid session token derived from a shared link with restricted permissions, every subsequent request for specific resources must be cross-referenced against the permission scope defined by that link. The absence of this mapping means that the authorization boundary is effectively porous. An adversary can exploit this by iterating through page identifiers or leveraging known patterns to access sensitive design components such as source files, asset libraries, and layout configurations that were intended to remain private within specific sections of a collaborative project. This constitutes an Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerability where the application relies on client-side assumptions rather than server-enforced constraints to maintain data isolation between different parts of a single file.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for teams relying on Penpot for confidential design work, intellectual property protection, and secure collaboration with external stakeholders. Design files often contain proprietary information including brand guidelines, user interface mockups that have not yet been released to the public, and underlying architectural decisions regarding application flow. By retrieving these elements without proper authorization checks, an attacker can achieve unauthorized data exfiltration of sensitive corporate assets. This breach compromises confidentiality and may lead to competitive disadvantage if trade secrets are leaked or enable further attacks such as social engineering based on detailed knowledge of a company's digital product strategy. Furthermore, because the vulnerability affects both page-level access and fragment retrieval, it allows for comprehensive reconstruction of design intent even when direct editing capabilities are restricted.
From a classification perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control, specifically reflecting failures in authorization logic where user input is not sufficiently validated against security policies before granting resource access. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, as the exploitation requires an attacker to possess a valid session or share link token, and potentially relates to T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object if one considers the design assets stored within the file structure as cloud-stored objects. The vulnerability highlights the importance of implementing strict object-level authorization checks for all API endpoints that expose sensitive data structures.
To mitigate this risk, organizations must immediately upgrade Penpot instances to version 2.18.0 or later where these access control validations have been corrected. For environments unable to patch instantly due to dependency constraints, temporary mitigations include restricting the scope of shared links to only those pages and fragments that are absolutely necessary for external collaboration, thereby reducing the attack surface available to potential exploiters. Additionally, implementing network-level monitoring can help detect anomalous patterns such as rapid sequential requests to different page IDs within a single session, which may indicate automated enumeration attempts exploiting this flaw. Regular security audits of API endpoints should include rigorous testing of authorization boundaries to ensure that permission scopes are strictly enforced at the server level for every individual resource request rather than relying on broad token validity alone.