CVE-2026-107014 in Bander Notepadinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 10/29/2026

Insecure permissions in Bander Notepad (bander.notepad) versionCode 12 allow unauthorized attackers to write and read notes in another user's' note database.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026

The vulnerability identified within Bander Notepad, specifically affecting the application with version code 12, represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms that governs how sensitive data is stored and accessed on Android devices. This flaw stems from insecure file permissions assigned to the internal storage locations where user notes are persisted. In typical secure implementations, private files created by an application should be restricted such that only the creating process can read or write them. However, in this instance, the application fails to enforce these restrictions properly, leaving the note database accessible to other applications installed on the same device. This misconfiguration effectively bypasses the Android sandboxing model, which is designed to isolate data between different apps and prevent unauthorized cross-application access.

From a technical perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource. The root cause lies in how the application initializes its storage files or databases without specifying appropriate mode flags that restrict visibility to other processes. When an Android app creates a file using modes such as MODE_WORLD_READABLE or MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE, it explicitly allows any other application on the device to interact with those files. Even if these specific legacy constants are not used directly, improper handling of internal storage paths can result in similar exposure due to default system behaviors or incorrect configuration during database initialization. This lack of strict isolation means that the confidentiality and integrity of user notes are compromised because there is no mechanism preventing external entities from accessing the underlying data structures.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for end-users who rely on Bander Notepad for storing personal, professional, or sensitive information. An attacker with a malicious application installed on the victim's device can exploit this weakness to read existing notes without triggering any alerts or requiring user interaction beyond the initial installation of the rogue app. Furthermore, the ability to write to another user’s note database allows an attacker to inject false entries, modify critical reminders, or delete important records entirely. This capability undermines trust in the application and poses risks ranging from privacy violations to potential social engineering attacks where fabricated notes are used to deceive users based on trusted context.

This type of vulnerability is also relevant to the MITRE ATT&CK framework under techniques related to Data Staged for Collection or Unsecured Credentials, particularly when considering how attackers gather data from local storage. It reflects a broader category of issues often seen in mobile applications that do not adhere strictly to platform-specific security guidelines regarding private data handling. The exposure allows for passive surveillance and active manipulation of user data without requiring elevated privileges such as root access, making it accessible to a wide range of threat actors who may have limited capabilities but sufficient opportunity to install apps on target devices.

To mitigate this vulnerability, the developers must immediately audit all file creation and database initialization code within Bander Notepad. It is essential to ensure that private files are created using MODE_PRIVATE or equivalent secure settings that restrict access exclusively to the application’s own process ID. Additionally, implementing Content Providers with strict permission checks can provide an additional layer of security if data sharing across apps is ever required in future versions. Users should be advised to update to a patched version as soon as it becomes available and to review installed applications for any suspicious behavior that might indicate exploitation attempts. Regular security audits focusing on Android-specific storage best practices will help prevent similar misconfigurations in other components of the application ecosystem.

Responsible

MITRE

Reservation

10/07/2026

Disclosure

10/29/2026

Moderation

accepted

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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