CVE-2026-119586 in SQLite
Summary
by MITRE • 10/30/2026
SQLite command-line shell through 3.54.1 contains a command injection vulnerability in the .recover command that emits attacker-planted dot-commands stored in sqlite_schema.sql values verbatim. Attackers can craft a database whose schema holds a valid CREATE statement followed by a .shell or .system line, executing OS commands when victims pipe .recover output into sqlite3.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/30/2026
The vulnerability identified within the SQLite command-line shell prior to version 3.54.1 represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper neutralization of special elements during input processing, specifically categorized under CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. This issue manifests exclusively through the .recover command utility, which is designed to extract data from corrupted or damaged SQLite database files by parsing the sqlite_schema table and reconstructing SQL statements for re-execution. The core technical failure lies in how the shell handles the sql column within the sqlite_schema virtual table when generating recovery output. Instead of sanitizing or escaping special characters that could be interpreted as shell directives, the tool emits these values verbatim to standard output. This design oversight allows an attacker who has write access to a database file to inject malicious payloads directly into the schema metadata.
An adversary can craft a SQLite database containing a legitimate CREATE TABLE statement followed immediately by dot-commands such as .shell or .system within the sql field of the sqlite_schema table. When a victim attempts to recover data from this compromised database using the command-line interface, the shell processes these injected entries without validation. If the user subsequently pipes the output of the recovery operation back into the sqlite3 executable for further processing, the embedded dot-commands are interpreted and executed by the host operating system with the privileges of the current user. This chain of events effectively transforms a data extraction utility into an arbitrary code execution vector, bypassing traditional security boundaries that might otherwise protect against direct command injection via SQL queries alone.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential for remote code execution in scenarios where database files are exchanged between untrusted parties or processed through automated pipelines. An attacker could leverage this flaw to exfiltrate sensitive information, install malware, or establish persistence on the target system by executing arbitrary shell commands. The attack relies heavily on social engineering or supply chain compromise tactics, requiring the victim to actively use the .recover command and pipe its output into another instance of sqlite3. This specific interaction model aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, as it involves the execution of system commands through a legitimate application component that has been manipulated via malicious input data rather than direct exploitation of the database engine itself.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability primarily involve upgrading to SQLite version 3.54.1 or later, where the issue has been addressed by implementing proper sanitization of dot-commands within the recovery output process. Organizations relying on older versions should implement strict validation controls when processing recovered data from untrusted sources and avoid piping raw recovery outputs directly into executable interpreters without intermediate inspection. Additionally, applying principle of least privilege to user accounts running database operations can limit the potential damage if an exploitation attempt succeeds. Security teams should also audit their use cases involving automated database repair workflows to ensure that no direct execution paths exist for recovered schema data unless it has been thoroughly validated against a whitelist of expected SQL structures.