CVE-2026-107038 in Yet Another UPnP Controller
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
Insecure permissions in Yet Another UPnP Controller versionCode 50200 allows unauthorized attackers to invoke an exported component, leading to arbitrary data access and control of application data.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified in Yet Another UPnP Controller with version code 50200 represents a critical misconfiguration within the Android application's security posture, specifically concerning the export status of its internal components. In the context of mobile operating systems like Android, applications are composed of distinct components such as activities, services, broadcast receivers, and content providers. By default, these components should be private to the application unless explicitly required for interaction with other apps or system services. However, in this instance, one or more exported components were configured without adequate permission checks or access controls. This configuration error allows any installed application on the same device, regardless of its privilege level, to directly invoke these exposed interfaces. The core technical flaw lies not necessarily in a code logic bug within the component itself, but rather in the manifest declaration that fails to restrict entry points using android:exported=false or by enforcing strict signature-level permissions. This oversight creates an attack surface where malicious actors can bypass standard application sandboxing mechanisms intended to isolate data and functionality between different apps.
The operational impact of this insecure permission setting is severe, as it facilitates arbitrary data access and unauthorized control over the application's internal state. An attacker who exploits this vulnerability can send crafted intents or broadcast messages to trigger specific functions within Yet Another UPnP Controller. Depending on the nature of the exported component, this could range from reading sensitive configuration files, accessing cached media library metadata, or manipulating network discovery settings that govern how the device interacts with Universal Plug and Play devices on a local network. Since UPnP controllers often manage complex networking tasks including port forwarding and device discovery, an attacker gaining control over these functions could potentially redirect traffic, expose internal services to external networks, or extract personal information stored locally by the application. This level of access undermines the confidentiality and integrity guarantees expected from mobile applications, effectively turning a utility app into a vector for local privilege escalation or data exfiltration within the device ecosystem.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-269, which denotes Improper Privilege Management, specifically in the context of operating system-level permissions and component exposure. It also relates to CWE-732, concerning Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource, as the exported components act as critical resources that require restricted access. Furthermore, within the MITRE ATT&CK framework for mobile platforms, this behavior is indicative of techniques associated with Component Reuse or improper interface handling, where an adversary leverages legitimate application features to achieve unauthorized objectives. The lack of authentication mechanisms on these exposed endpoints means that no verification step exists to confirm whether the calling process has a legitimate relationship with the target app, allowing any peer application to interact freely. This is particularly dangerous in shared device environments or when malicious apps are installed via sideloading, as they can silently exploit this flaw without user interaction or awareness.
Mitigation strategies must focus on tightening the security configuration of the Android manifest and implementing robust access controls at the code level. The primary remediation step involves setting android:exported=false for all components that do not strictly require external invocation by other applications. If certain components, such as broadcast receivers handling system events or activities intended for deep linking from specific trusted sources, must remain exported, they should be protected using signature-level permissions defined in the manifest and enforced via checkCallingPermission() methods within the code. Additionally, developers should implement strict input validation on all entry points to ensure that only expected data formats are processed, preventing potential injection attacks through intent extras. Regular security audits of application components and automated static analysis tools configured to detect insecure export configurations can help identify such misconfigurations early in the development lifecycle. Users affected by this vulnerability should update to a patched version if available or restrict app installation sources to trusted repositories to minimize exposure to malicious peers capable of exploiting these exported interfaces.