CVE-2026-108708 in Wukong_HRM
Summary
by MITRE • 10/11/2026
Wukong_HRM through commit 186115e contains a missing authorization vulnerability because EmployeeAspect assigns every caller the HR administrator role and EmployeeUtil data-scope checks return all employees. Any authenticated low-privileged employee can read payslips, salary records, bank cards and personal data, edit bank cards, and delete employees, departments and contracts company-wide.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/11/2026
The vulnerability identified in Wukong_HRM prior to commit 186115e represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms, specifically classified under CWE-284 as Improper Access Control. This flaw stems from the incorrect implementation of role-based access control within the application's backend logic. The core issue lies in the EmployeeAspect component, which is designed to enforce security policies based on user roles during method execution. However, due to a logical error or misconfiguration, this aspect erroneously assigns every authenticated caller the HR administrator role, regardless of their actual privileges within the system. This effectively bypasses any intended restrictions that would normally limit an employee's actions to their own profile or specific departmental scope.
The technical manifestation of this vulnerability is further compounded by the behavior of the EmployeeUtil data-scope checks. In a properly secured application, these utility functions should filter database queries to ensure users only access records relevant to their assigned permissions. Instead, the flawed implementation causes these checks to return all employee records in the system without applying any restrictive filters based on user identity or role. This combination creates a scenario where the security layer not only fails to deny unauthorized actions but actively facilitates them by providing unrestricted data visibility and administrative capabilities to every logged-in user.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, affecting both confidentiality and integrity across the entire organization's human resources infrastructure. Any authenticated low-privileged employee can exploit this flaw to perform sensitive operations that should be restricted to HR administrators or higher-level management personnel. Specifically, attackers with minimal privileges can read highly confidential personal information including payslips, salary records, bank card details, and other private data belonging to all employees in the company. This constitutes a massive breach of privacy and potentially violates regulatory compliance standards such as GDPR or CCPA depending on the jurisdiction.
Beyond unauthorized data access, the vulnerability allows for significant integrity violations. Low-privileged users can edit bank account information for any employee, which could lead to financial fraud if payments are redirected maliciously. Furthermore, they possess the ability to delete employees, departments, and employment contracts company-wide. This capability poses a direct threat to business continuity and organizational stability, as critical HR data can be erased or corrupted by unauthorized actors. The lack of proper authorization checks means that there is no audit trail distinguishing between legitimate administrative actions and malicious exploitation, complicating forensic analysis after an incident.
From a tactical perspective, this vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to privilege escalation and collection of sensitive data. An attacker would first authenticate using valid credentials for any standard employee account. Once inside, they could leverage the improper access control to escalate their effective privileges to that of an HR administrator without needing additional exploits or social engineering. This allows them to move laterally within the system by accessing broader datasets than intended and potentially pivot to other systems if such data is used in credential stuffing attacks against internal services.
Mitigation strategies must address both the immediate code defect and the underlying architectural weaknesses. The primary fix involves correcting the logic within EmployeeAspect to ensure that role assignment accurately reflects the user's actual permissions stored in the database or identity provider, rather than defaulting all users to an administrative role. Simultaneously, the EmployeeUtil data-scope checks must be revised to enforce strict filtering based on the authenticated user's ID and departmental affiliation. It is essential to implement principle of least privilege throughout the application layer, ensuring that API endpoints validate permissions before processing requests for sensitive resources like financial records or employee deletion operations.
In addition to code remediation, organizations should conduct a comprehensive review of their access control policies across all modules. Implementing robust logging and monitoring for administrative actions can help detect exploitation attempts in real-time. Regular security testing, including penetration tests focused on broken object level authorization (BOLA) scenarios, is recommended to identify similar flaws before they are exploited. Updating the software to commit 186115e or later resolves this specific issue by correcting these fundamental access control errors, thereby restoring the intended separation of duties and protecting sensitive employee data from unauthorized exposure or manipulation.