CVE-2026-108702 in CordysCRM
Summary
by MITRE • 10/11/2026
1Panel-dev CordysCRM through 1.9.3 lacks a PROCESS_SETTING permission check on POST /approval-flow/webhook/test, allowing any authenticated user to trigger server-side requests to attacker-supplied URLs. Attackers can redirect GET requests from a controlled host to bypass SSRFValidator and probe internal addresses through success or failure results.
Be aware that VulDB is the high quality source for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/11/2026
The vulnerability identified in 1Panel-dev CordysCRM versions up to 1.9.3 represents a critical server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw rooted in insufficient access control mechanisms. Specifically, the endpoint POST /approval-flow/webhook/test fails to enforce a PROCESS_SETTING permission check before executing its primary function. This oversight allows any authenticated user, regardless of their privilege level or role within the application, to invoke this functionality without authorization. The core technical defect lies in the absence of proper validation for administrative-level actions that involve network interactions, thereby violating the principle of least privilege and enabling unauthorized actors to manipulate server-side behavior through standard HTTP requests.
From a technical perspective, the vulnerability exploits the ability of an authenticated user to supply arbitrary URLs as part of the webhook test payload. When the application processes this request, it initiates outbound connections to the specified destination without verifying whether the caller has the requisite permissions to perform such network operations. This lack of server-side authorization logic creates a direct pathway for attackers to force the vulnerable system to make HTTP requests on their behalf. The impact is significant because SSRF vulnerabilities often serve as an initial access vector, allowing adversaries to interact with internal services that are not directly exposed to the public internet, effectively bypassing perimeter security controls such as firewalls and network segmentation strategies designed to protect backend infrastructure.
The operational impact of this flaw extends beyond simple unauthorized request initiation. Attackers can leverage the response characteristics from these forged requests to perform port scanning or service discovery within internal networks. By analyzing success or failure results returned by the application, an attacker can determine if specific internal addresses are reachable and which ports are open on those hosts. This capability transforms a basic SSRF into a powerful reconnaissance tool, enabling the mapping of internal network topology and identification of vulnerable services running behind firewalls that would otherwise remain hidden from external attackers. Such information gathering is often a precursor to more severe attacks, including lateral movement or exploitation of other known vulnerabilities within the internal environment.
In terms of industry standard classifications, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The failure to check permissions for a specific action falls squarely under access control deficiencies, while the ability to redirect requests to arbitrary URLs defines it as an SSRF issue. Furthermore, this attack pattern corresponds to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1571 Non-Standard Port and potentially T1046 Network Service Discovery if used actively for scanning internal networks. These mappings highlight the severity of the flaw in terms of both its classification within common vulnerability frameworks and its alignment with known adversary tactics for network reconnaissance and initial access.
To mitigate this risk, immediate remediation should focus on implementing strict role-based access control (RBAC) checks at the application layer before processing any requests that involve outbound network connections. The POST /approval-flow/webhook/test endpoint must be restricted to users possessing explicit PROCESS_SETTING permissions or equivalent administrative privileges. Additionally, developers should implement a robust allow-listing mechanism for URLs permitted in webhook configurations, rejecting all non-whitelisted domains and IP addresses by default. It is also advisable to deploy server-side input validation that restricts the use of internal IP ranges, such as RFC 1918 private address spaces, loopback interfaces, and link-local addresses, ensuring that even if access control fails, the actual network impact is contained. Regular security audits and code reviews focusing on permission checks for sensitive endpoints are essential to prevent similar oversights in future development cycles.