CVE-2026-108737 in Traccar
Summary
by MITRE • 10/11/2026
Traccar through 6.16.0 contains a weak password recovery vulnerability that allows attackers to reuse password reset tokens as session credentials because TokenManager does not bind tokens to a purpose. Attackers holding a leaked reset link can obtain a full session via /api/session or change passwords via /api/password/update, retaining access for seven days even after the victim resets their password.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/11/2026
The vulnerability identified in Traccar versions up to 6.16.0 represents a critical flaw in the authentication and session management architecture, specifically within the TokenManager component. This issue stems from an improper implementation of token binding, where generated password reset tokens are not associated with specific purposes or contexts such as user identity, IP address, or intended action scope. In secure systems, cryptographic tokens must be bound to their intended use case to prevent reuse in unauthorized contexts. By failing to enforce this binding, the application allows a single token issued for one purpose, typically resetting a password, to be interpreted and executed by other endpoints that expect different types of credentials or session identifiers. This architectural weakness fundamentally undermines the isolation between administrative actions and standard user sessions, creating a pathway for privilege escalation and unauthorized access.
From an operational perspective, this flaw allows attackers who obtain a leaked or intercepted password reset link to bypass traditional authentication barriers entirely. Instead of merely resetting a victim's password, which would typically lock out the attacker if they were using their own credentials, the attacker can directly utilize the reset token as a valid session credential by submitting it to the /api/session endpoint. This action grants the attacker an active session with full privileges equivalent to the compromised user account. Furthermore, the attacker can leverage the same token to modify the victim's password via the /api/password/update endpoint. The severity of this impact is compounded by the fact that these tokens remain valid for seven days after issuance. Consequently, even if a vigilant administrator or user detects the compromise and changes their password, the previously leaked reset link remains functional within its validity window, allowing persistent access to the system without requiring further exploitation steps.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-287, which describes Improper Authentication, as well as CWE-613, Insufficient Session Expiration, due to the prolonged validity period of the tokens and their misuse across different authentication contexts. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior maps directly to T1078 Valid Accounts, where attackers leverage legitimate credentials or session tokens to maintain access without triggering typical intrusion detection alerts associated with brute force or credential stuffing attacks. The ability to reuse a reset token as a session identifier also reflects aspects of T1528 Steal Application Access Token, although in this case the token is not an OAuth-style bearer token but rather a custom application-specific authentication artifact that has been misinterpreted by the server logic.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate patching to version 6.17.0 or later is required, as these versions address the underlying flaw in the TokenManager implementation. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, administrators should implement strict input validation on session endpoints to ensure that tokens presented for authentication are verified against a whitelist of allowed token types and purposes. Additionally, enforcing short-lived token expiration policies reduces the window of opportunity for attackers exploiting leaked links. It is also recommended to bind reset tokens to specific user identifiers and IP addresses at generation time, ensuring they cannot be replayed by different users or from unauthorized locations. Regular audits of authentication flows should include testing for token reuse across different API endpoints to identify similar architectural weaknesses in other parts of the application logic.