CVE-2026-111655 in think-plugs-admin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
ThinkAdmin think-plugs-admin through 1.0.81 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that allows non-super administrators to read and overwrite other administrators' file records via admin/file.edit. Attackers holding the admin/file.edit node can request or POST a target id with columns like xurl, hash, or uuid to view download URLs, tamper records, or reassign ownership.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/16/2026
The vulnerability identified in ThinkAdmin versions through 1.0.81 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms, specifically classified as an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). This flaw resides within the admin/file.edit functionality of the application's administrative interface. The core technical issue stems from insufficient server-side validation when processing requests related to file management operations. Specifically, the system fails to verify that the authenticated user initiating a request possesses the necessary privileges for the specific resource being accessed or modified. Instead of binding access rights to the object itself based on ownership or role-based permissions, the application relies primarily on the presence of the admin/file.edit node permission in the user's profile. This architectural oversight allows any administrator with this broad permission set to interact with file records belonging to other administrators, bypassing intended isolation boundaries between different administrative accounts.
From a technical perspective, the exploitation vector involves manipulating specific parameters within HTTP requests directed at the affected endpoint. Attackers can leverage standard GET or POST methods to supply target identifiers such as xurl, hash, or uuid in place of their own file records. By substituting these unique identifiers with those belonging to other users, an attacker can retrieve sensitive information including direct download URLs for files stored within the system. Furthermore, the vulnerability extends beyond mere data disclosure; it permits unauthorized modification and reassignment of ownership. An adversary can alter metadata associated with a target record or transfer administrative control of that file to their own account. This capability effectively allows lower-privilege administrators to escalate their influence over critical assets managed by higher-level administrators, undermining the integrity of the system's permission model.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in multi-administrator environments where distinct roles and responsibilities are expected to be enforced through technical controls. The ability to read other administrators' file records exposes confidential data that may include proprietary documents, personal identifiable information, or sensitive business intelligence. Beyond confidentiality breaches, the capacity to overwrite or reassign ownership introduces significant risks to data integrity and availability. Malicious actors could corrupt critical files by overwriting them with malicious content or render resources inaccessible by transferring ownership away from legitimate users. This erosion of trust within the administrative layer can lead to operational disruptions, compliance violations regarding data protection regulations such as GDPR or HIPAA if sensitive records are exposed, and potential further compromise through supply chain attacks if compromised file assets contain executable code or configuration files that influence system behavior.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate action is required to patch the ThinkAdmin installation to version 1.0.82 or later where these access control checks have been rectified. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, temporary mitigations should focus on restricting network-level access to administrative interfaces and implementing strict role-based access controls that limit the admin/file.edit permission only to users who absolutely require it for their specific job functions. Additionally, deploying a Web Application Firewall with rules designed to detect anomalous patterns in parameter manipulation may provide an additional layer of defense against exploitation attempts. Long-term remediation strategies should include conducting thorough code reviews focused on implementing proper object-level authorization checks and adopting security development lifecycle practices that emphasize testing for broken access control vulnerabilities as defined by industry standards such as CWE-639, which specifically addresses the issue of relying solely on user-supplied input to determine resource access without verifying ownership or permissions. Regular penetration testing should also be integrated into the maintenance cycle to ensure that similar flaws do not persist in other modules of the application.