CVE-2026-111802 in Red Hat
Summary
by MITRE • 10/17/2026
A flaw was found in Nautilus. When a removable drive or disk image is unmounted or ejected, Nautilus prompts the user to empty the trash without verifying whether the trash directory paths are symbolic links. An attacker can exploit this flaw by tricking a user into mounting a crafted storage volume and confirming the prompt to empty the trash, leading to the arbitrary deletion of files accessible to that user.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/17/2026
The vulnerability identified in Nautilus represents a critical failure in input validation regarding filesystem operations during device unmounting events. This flaw specifically targets the mechanism used by the file manager when handling removable drives or disk images. Under normal operational procedures, when a user ejects or unmounts external storage media, Nautilus often prompts the user to empty the trash associated with that volume to ensure data integrity and free up space on the device before it is removed. However, the application fails to verify whether the path designated as the trash directory is a symbolic link rather than a standard directory structure. This lack of verification creates a significant security gap where the application blindly follows the symlink without checking its target location or permissions context.
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious storage volume that contains a specifically designed filesystem layout. By tricking an unsuspecting user into mounting this crafted drive and subsequently interacting with it, the attacker sets the stage for exploitation. When the user attempts to unmount or eject the device, Nautilus triggers its standard cleanup routine, which includes prompting to empty the trash. Because the application does not validate that the trash path is a legitimate directory on the removable media itself, but instead accepts symbolic links pointing elsewhere in the local filesystem, it proceeds with deletion operations based on the symlink target. This behavior allows an attacker who controls the contents of the mounted volume to dictate where files are deleted by manipulating the symlink targets within the crafted storage image.
The operational impact of this flaw is severe, as it leads to arbitrary file deletion accessible to the user running Nautilus. Since symbolic links can point to directories outside the scope of the removable media, such as the user's home directory or system configuration folders, confirming the prompt results in the permanent loss of data located at these target paths. This constitutes a denial-of-service condition for critical files and potentially exposes sensitive information if those deleted files contained personal or proprietary data that was not backed up. The attack requires only social engineering to persuade the victim to mount the drive and confirm the trash emptying action, making it a low-complexity but high-impact threat vector against end-users who frequently interact with external storage devices like USB drives or external hard disks.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access, commonly known as a symbolic link following issue. The application resolves the path to the trash directory without ensuring that it remains within an expected boundary or is not a symlink pointing outside the intended scope. In terms of adversary tactics, this flaw facilitates actions consistent with ATT&CK technique T1485 Data Destruction, where an attacker aims to destroy data on local systems and network drives. The exploitation relies heavily on user interaction, placing it in the realm of social engineering combined with technical execution via a trusted application component.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability involve both immediate software updates and long-term defensive coding practices. Users should ensure that their Nautilus packages are updated to versions where the symlink validation logic has been corrected to strictly verify directory types before performing deletion operations. Developers must implement strict path canonicalization checks, ensuring that any file operation targets a real directory within the expected mount point rather than following symlinks to arbitrary locations. Additionally, implementing sandboxing or restricted permissions for trash management routines can limit the blast radius of such errors. Security awareness training should also emphasize caution when mounting untrusted removable media, as these devices may contain malicious filesystem structures designed to trigger unintended system behaviors in file managers that lack robust input validation mechanisms.