CVE-2026-96627 in Arcane
Summary
by MITRE • 10/17/2026
Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 2.6.0, UpdateUser in backend/api/handlers/users.go sets PasswordHash for any target without comparing caller and target privilege. A holder of delegated users:update permission can submit a password change for the global administrator, replace the administrator password, and authenticate as that account, resulting in complete global administrator account takeover. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/17/2026
The vulnerability identified within Arcane versions prior to 2.6.0 represents a critical failure in access control logic, specifically manifesting as an Insecure Direct Object Reference combined with Broken Access Control mechanisms. Arcane serves as a management interface for Docker infrastructure components such as containers, images, networks, and volumes. The core of the flaw resides in the backend API handler responsible for user updates, located at backend/api/handlers/users.go. When the UpdateUser function is invoked to modify account credentials, it fails to perform an essential authorization check that verifies whether the authenticated caller possesses sufficient privileges relative to the target user account being modified. This oversight allows any user possessing the delegated users:update permission to bypass privilege boundaries and interact with administrative accounts as if they were their own or lower-privileged entities.
From a technical perspective, the vulnerability exploits the lack of vertical access control validation during credential modification operations. The system accepts requests to change the PasswordHash field for any specified target identifier without validating that the session context matches the required security clearance level for that specific identity. Consequently, an attacker with standard delegated permissions can craft API requests targeting the global administrator account's unique identifier. By submitting a new password hash for this high-privilege entity, the attacker effectively hijacks the administrative credentials. This action does not require exploitation of memory corruption or injection flaws but relies entirely on logical errors in the application’s permission enforcement layer.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, leading to complete global administrator account takeover. Once an attacker successfully updates the password for the global admin account, they can authenticate using these new credentials. This grants them full control over the Docker environment managed by Arcane, including the ability to create privileged containers, access sensitive host resources, modify network configurations, and potentially escalate further into the underlying infrastructure. The compromise of a single administrative credential in this context equates to a total breach of the containerized ecosystem's integrity and confidentiality.
This flaw aligns with CWE-269, which classifies Improper Privilege Management, specifically highlighting cases where an actor is able to elevate privileges by exploiting insufficient checks on user roles or permissions. Furthermore, it maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as the attacker leverages legitimate but improperly validated credentials to gain unauthorized access and maintain persistence within the system. The vulnerability underscores the importance of implementing strict object-level authorization checks that verify both horizontal and vertical privilege levels before allowing modifications to sensitive account attributes.
To mitigate this risk, organizations must upgrade Arcane to version 2.6.0 or later, where the developers have addressed the missing validation logic in the UpdateUser handler. In addition to upgrading, security teams should enforce principle of least privilege by ensuring that delegated permissions are scoped narrowly and do not grant broad update capabilities without additional verification steps. Implementing multi-factor authentication for administrative accounts can also provide a secondary layer of defense against credential-based attacks resulting from such logical flaws. Regular code audits focusing on access control lists and permission validation logic are recommended to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future development cycles.