CVE-2026-111949 in 2FA Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/21/2026
The miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin before 6.3.1 does not prevent a pending passkey login from registering an additional passkey on an account that already has one configured, allowing an attacker who knows a user's password to add their own authenticator and bypass the second factor.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/21/2026
The vulnerability identified in miniOrange 2FA for WordPress prior to version 6.3.1 represents a critical authentication logic flaw within the multi-factor authentication workflow. Specifically, the plugin fails to enforce mutual exclusivity or proper state management when handling passkey registration requests during an active login session that relies on pending credentials. This architectural oversight allows an attacker who has already compromised a user's primary password credential to manipulate the authentication flow and inject their own authenticator device into the account configuration without triggering additional verification steps for the new key itself.
From a technical perspective, the flaw resides in the sequence of operations during the passkey registration process. When a user initiates a login using an existing passkey or pending credentials, the system should ideally lock down further authentication method modifications until the session is fully established and verified. However, because this check is missing, the application permits the execution of the register-passkey endpoint while the initial authentication context remains unresolved. This allows the attacker to complete the registration of a new WebAuthn credential under the victim's account profile effectively hijacking the second factor mechanism rather than bypassing it entirely through simple password guessing.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it directly undermines the core security promise of two-factor authentication. By adding their own passkey, an attacker gains persistent access to the compromised WordPress administrator or user account even if the original credentials are changed later, provided they retain control over their injected authenticator device. This persistence mechanism effectively neutralizes the protective value of MFA for any accounts where this specific registration race condition is exploited. The attacker can subsequently perform administrative actions, exfiltrate sensitive data, or install further malicious plugins with elevated privileges that standard password resets cannot revoke if the passkey remains active in the system configuration.
This issue aligns closely with CWE-287, which describes Improper Authentication, specifically regarding failures to correctly verify identity during credential modification processes. Furthermore, it relates to CWE-640, Weak Password Recovery Mechanisms for Administrators or Users, as it allows an attacker to alter recovery and authentication methods without sufficient proof of ownership of the existing secure factors. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK mapping, this behavior facilitates Account Manipulation (T1098) by adding new credentials to maintain access, and potentially Credential Access (T1528) if the passkey registration process exposes additional token information that could be leveraged in subsequent attacks.
To mitigate this vulnerability, administrators must immediately upgrade the miniOrange 2FA plugin to version 6.3.1 or later where these logical checks have been implemented. Until an update is applied, it is advisable to disable passkey authentication features if they are not strictly required for all users, thereby removing the attack vector entirely. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict password policies and monitor user accounts for unexpected changes in registered authenticator devices or login methods as a detective control against exploitation of this logic flaw. Regular auditing of MFA configurations can help identify unauthorized additions of passkeys that may indicate prior successful exploitation of this weakness.