CVE-2026-112287 in laravel-crm
Summary
by MITRE • 10/19/2026
Krayin CRM before 2.2.7 contains a broken object level authorization vulnerability in EmailController write actions that allows scope-restricted authenticated users to manipulate other users' emails by supplying their numeric IDs. Attackers can call update, destroy, mass-update or mass-destroy endpoints to edit, re-send via is_draft=0, trash or permanently delete emails and disclose their subject, body and linked lead and person data.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/19/2026
The vulnerability identified in Krayin CRM versions prior to 2.2.7 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms, specifically classified under the category of Broken Object Level Authorization, commonly known as BOLA or IDOR within industry standards such as CWE-639. This flaw resides within the EmailController component and affects write operations that are intended for scope-restricted authenticated users. In a properly secured system, an application must verify that the authenticated user has permission to access or modify the specific object they are requesting. However, in this instance, the server-side logic fails to validate whether the numeric identifier provided by the client corresponds to resources owned by or accessible to the current session's user context. Instead, the application blindly trusts the input parameters supplied via HTTP requests, allowing any authenticated actor to bypass authorization checks simply by altering the target resource identifiers.
The technical mechanism of this exploitation involves manipulating the unique numeric IDs associated with email records within the CRM database structure. By intercepting and modifying API calls or form submissions directed at update, destroy, mass-update, or mass-destroy endpoints, an attacker can specify arbitrary email IDs that belong to other users in the system. Because the application does not enforce ownership checks against these identifiers, it proceeds to execute the requested actions on behalf of the authenticated user but applied to the victim's data. This lack of object-level validation means that the boundary between different tenants or individual user accounts is effectively dissolved for write operations involving email management functions.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the breadth of actions an attacker can perform once they have gained control over another user's email records. An adversary can edit existing emails, potentially altering communication history and misleading business processes. They can also force the re-sending of draft emails by setting the is_draft flag to zero, which could lead to unauthorized communications being sent from a victim's account, damaging reputation or leaking sensitive information. Furthermore, attackers have the capability to trash or permanently delete emails, resulting in data loss that may disrupt ongoing business operations and violate compliance requirements regarding record retention. The ability to disclose subject lines, email bodies, and linked lead and person data constitutes a significant privacy breach, exposing confidential customer interactions and personal identifiable information to unauthorized parties.
From an offensive security perspective, this vulnerability aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK framework technique T1078, specifically Valid Accounts, as it relies on legitimate credentials but abuses them for unintended purposes. It also relates to T1530, Data from Cloud Storage, and potentially T1499, Endpoint Denial of Service if mass deletion is employed to disrupt availability. The exploitation does not require complex binary analysis or memory corruption techniques; rather, it exploits a logical flaw in the application's business logic layer, making it relatively easy to discover using automated scanning tools that test for parameter tampering and authorization bypasses.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust server-side validation for all object-level operations. Developers should ensure that every write request includes checks verifying that the resource being modified belongs to the authenticated user or falls within their authorized scope. This can be achieved by joining database queries with user ownership tables or using middleware that validates permissions before controller logic executes. Additionally, employing indirect reference maps where internal numeric IDs are replaced with opaque, randomly generated identifiers for external use can reduce the predictability of resource addresses and make enumeration attacks more difficult. Regular security audits focusing on access control patterns and unit tests covering authorization scenarios are essential to prevent regression of this flaw in future releases.