CVE-2026-114278 in Che
Summary
by MITRE • 10/28/2026
The che-machine-exec service constructs a shell command by concatenating user-controlled input (the username and namespace fields from the /exec/init and /exec/config JSON endpoints) into a double-quoted sh -c "echo "..." > ..." invocation without any escaping. When che-machine-exec is run with authentication disabled (its default), any network-reachable attacker can achieve remote code execution in containers che-machine-exec is configured to access, via shell command substitution ($(...) or backticks).
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/28/2026
The vulnerability identified within the che-machine-exec service represents a critical Remote Code Execution flaw stemming from improper neutralization of special elements used in an operating system command. This issue arises specifically when the service constructs shell commands by concatenating user-controlled input, namely the username and namespace fields received via the /exec/init and /exec/config JSON endpoints. The resulting command is executed through a double-quoted sh -c invocation that utilizes echo to write data into a file. Crucially, this process lacks any form of escaping or sanitization for special shell characters, leaving the system vulnerable to injection attacks where an attacker can manipulate the intended command structure.
From a technical perspective, the core flaw is classified under CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly known as OS Command Injection. The vulnerability exploits the behavior of the POSIX-compliant shell when processing double-quoted strings. While double quotes generally prevent word splitting and pathname expansion, they do not neutralize command substitution operators such as dollar-parentheses $(...) or backticks `` ` ``. When these characters are present within the injected username or namespace fields, the shell interprets them as instructions to execute arbitrary commands rather than treating them as literal string data. This allows an attacker to break out of the intended echo redirection context and inject arbitrary system-level commands that will be executed with the privileges of the che-machine-exec process.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the default configuration settings of the che-machine-exec service. By default, authentication is disabled for this component, which means there are no access controls preventing unauthorized users from interacting with its endpoints. Consequently, any network-reachable attacker can exploit this flaw without needing valid credentials. Successful exploitation results in Remote Code Execution within the containers that che-machine-exec is configured to manage and access. This effectively grants an adversary full control over the underlying container environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, lateral movement across the cluster, or complete compromise of the infrastructure hosting these workloads.
In terms of threat modeling and industry frameworks, this vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically sub-techniques related to shell commands like sh or bash. The attack vector is categorized under Network-Based exploitation (T1190) since it can be triggered remotely over the network without prior access to the host system. Furthermore, because the execution occurs within a containerized environment managed by an orchestration platform, this also touches upon Container and Cloud Compromise tactics, where gaining shell access in one component often serves as a pivot point for broader cluster compromise.
Mitigation strategies must address both the immediate technical flaw and the underlying configuration risks. The most effective remediation is to implement strict input validation and sanitization on all user-supplied data before it is used in any system command construction. Specifically, developers should avoid passing unsanitized variables directly into shell commands; instead, they should use language-specific APIs that do not invoke a shell interpreter or employ rigorous escaping mechanisms if shell invocation is unavoidable. Additionally, the service must be configured to enforce authentication by default, ensuring that only authorized users can access the /exec/init and /exec/config endpoints. Network-level controls such as firewalls or network policies restricting access to these internal services from untrusted networks provide an additional layer of defense in depth against exploitation attempts.