CVE-2026-118677 in n8n
Summary
by MITRE • 10/28/2026
n8n before 2.41.4 and 2.42.x before 2.42.1 contains a missing confirmation vulnerability in the Local Gateway desktop app that allows its deep-link connect handler to silently re-pair the app with a different n8n instance. Attackers can lure users running the Local Gateway into opening a crafted n8n-computer-use:// link to connect their computer to an attacker-controlled instance, inheriting previously granted permissions and acting on the computer through the gateway.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/28/2026
The vulnerability identified in versions of n8n prior to 2.41.4 and within the 2.42.x series before version 2.42.1 represents a critical security flaw rooted in the authentication flow of the Local Gateway desktop application. This specific issue is classified as a missing confirmation or authorization bypass, which fundamentally undermines the trust model established between the user's local environment and remote automation instances. The core technical failure lies within the deep-link connect handler mechanism designed to facilitate seamless integration between the n8n platform and external systems via the computer-use protocol. Instead of requiring explicit user consent for each new connection attempt or verifying that the target instance matches a previously authorized entity, the application silently accepts re-pairing requests from any provided URL scheme. This design oversight allows an attacker to exploit the deep-link functionality by crafting malicious links using the n8n-computer-use:// protocol and luring users into opening them through social engineering tactics such as phishing emails or compromised websites.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability enables session hijacking at the application level rather than just within web sessions. When a user interacts with the crafted link, the Local Gateway desktop app initiates a connection to an attacker-controlled n8n instance without prompting for re-authentication or displaying any warning about changing the connected environment. Consequently, the client inherits all permissions previously granted by the user during initial setup, including access to files, system commands, and other sensitive resources exposed through the gateway interface. This effectively grants the remote attacker full operational control over the victim's computer under the guise of legitimate automation workflows. The impact is severe because it bypasses traditional perimeter defenses that might monitor network traffic but do not inspect local application behavior or deep-link interactions.
The operational impact extends beyond simple data exfiltration to include potential for persistent backdoor access and lateral movement within an organization if the compromised machine serves as a pivot point. Attackers can execute arbitrary commands, modify system configurations, steal sensitive documents, or install additional malware using the elevated privileges inherited from the legitimate user session. This aligns with CWE-287, which describes Improper Authentication, specifically where authentication mechanisms are bypassed due to missing verification steps in critical security flows. Furthermore, this attack vector maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1566.001, Phishing: Spearphishing Link, as it relies on deceiving users into initiating a connection that compromises their system integrity. It also relates to CWE-347, Improper Verification of Authentication Credentials, since the application fails to verify the identity and trustworthiness of the remote instance before establishing a privileged session.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary defense is upgrading n8n Local Gateway desktop applications to version 2.41.4 or later for stable releases, and version 2.42.1 or later for the 2.42.x branch, where this logic error has been corrected by enforcing explicit user confirmation before re-pairing with a different instance. Administrators should also implement strict content security policies that restrict deep-link protocols to trusted domains if possible, although browser-based restrictions may limit direct control over desktop app handlers. User awareness training is crucial to recognize suspicious links requesting automation permissions. Additionally, organizations should monitor for unusual outbound connections from the Local Gateway process and consider network segmentation to isolate machines running such integrations from critical infrastructure assets until patches are fully deployed across all endpoints.