CVE-2026-114370 in Apache Camel
Summary
by MITRE • 10/21/2026
A flaw was found in the PathResourceManager component of the Undertow web server. This component is responsible for serving static files from the file system. The issue occurs because the mechanism used to verify if a symbolic link points to a safe location only checks if the target path starts with a specific string, without ensuring it matches a full directory name. This could allow an attacker to access files in a sibling directory if that directorys name starts with the same characters as an authorized safe directory.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/21/2026
The vulnerability identified within the PathResourceManager component of the Undertow web server represents a critical path traversal flaw rooted in insufficient validation logic for symbolic links. This specific subsystem is tasked with serving static files from the underlying file system, a function that inherently requires strict boundary enforcement to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data. The core technical deficiency lies in how the application verifies whether a requested resource resolves to an authorized location through symbolic link resolution. Instead of performing a comprehensive check against the full canonical path or ensuring that the resolved target resides strictly within the designated safe directory, the implementation relies on a simplistic prefix matching strategy. This mechanism merely checks if the resulting file path begins with the string representing the allowed base directory. While this approach may appear efficient for basic validation, it fails to account for edge cases where directory names share common prefixes, thereby creating a significant security gap that can be exploited by malicious actors.
The operational impact of this flaw is severe, as it allows an attacker to bypass access controls and read files located in sibling directories or other parts of the file system outside the intended scope. For instance, if the safe directory is named /var/www/html/safe and a sibling directory exists at /var/www/html/sensitive, a request for a symbolic link pointing to ../sensitive/secret_file would resolve to a path starting with /var/www/html/sa... which might incorrectly pass validation checks depending on the specific implementation details of the prefix check. This lack of precise boundary enforcement means that any file within a directory whose name starts with the same characters as an authorized safe directory becomes accessible. Consequently, attackers can potentially exfiltrate configuration files, source code, credentials, or other sensitive information that was not intended to be served by the web server, leading to data breaches and potential further compromise of the underlying infrastructure.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, commonly known as path traversal. The specific mechanism failure also relates to CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access, highlighting that the system does not adequately resolve or validate symbolic links before granting access. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this flaw facilitates techniques associated with ATT&CK T1083: File and Directory Discovery, as it enables an attacker to enumerate and retrieve files outside their permitted scope without direct authentication bypasses on higher-level application logic. The vulnerability underscores the importance of robust input validation for file system operations, particularly when dealing with dynamic paths or symbolic links which can obscure the true location of a resource.
To mitigate this risk, developers must replace the current prefix-based verification with a rigorous canonical path resolution strategy. This involves resolving all symbolic links to their absolute physical paths and then verifying that the final resolved path is strictly within the allowed base directory using exact string comparison or standard library functions designed for path containment checks. Additionally, implementing strict allow-lists for served directories and disabling symlink following where possible can further reduce the attack surface. Regular security audits focusing on file system access patterns are recommended to ensure that such logical flaws do not persist in production environments.