CVE-2026-115331 in Lotus
Summary
by MITRE • 10/22/2026
Lotus through 0.10.2 contains an sql injection vulnerability that allows authenticated organization users to inject SQL by supplying crafted billable metric property_name or categorical filter values. Attackers can embed SQL in values rendered unescaped into Jinja-generated counter, gauge and rate metric queries to access the database shared by all tenants.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/22/2026
The identified security flaw resides within Lotus versions up to 0.10.2 and represents a critical server-side injection vulnerability affecting multi-tenant SaaS architectures. This specific weakness is classified under CWE-89, which denotes Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. The root cause lies in the application's handling of user-supplied input for billable metric property names and categorical filter values. Instead of properly sanitizing or parameterizing these inputs before their inclusion in database queries, the system passes them directly into a Jinja2 templating engine. This design choice creates a direct pathway for malicious actors to manipulate backend data structures through crafted HTTP requests that target specific configuration parameters rather than traditional form fields or URL arguments typically associated with injection attacks.
The operational mechanics of this vulnerability rely on the interaction between user input and server-side template rendering. When an authenticated organization user provides values for metric properties or categorical filters, these strings are embedded into Jinja-generated SQL queries used to calculate counters, gauges, and rate metrics. Because the application fails to escape special characters within these inputs before they reach the database layer, attackers can inject arbitrary SQL syntax. This allows them to alter the logic of the query itself rather than just filtering results. For instance, an attacker could append a UNION SELECT statement or use boolean-based blind injection techniques to extract data from other tables or modify existing records. The severity is compounded by the fact that these metrics are often calculated in real-time or near-real-time during billing processes, meaning successful exploitation can have immediate and widespread consequences across the platform's infrastructure.
The impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple data exfiltration due to the multi-tenant nature of the Lotus architecture. Since all tenants share a single database instance, an attacker who successfully exploits this SQL injection vector gains the ability to access sensitive information belonging to other organizations within the same ecosystem. This constitutes a severe breach of isolation principles and can lead to unauthorized disclosure of proprietary business data, customer lists, or financial records stored in shared tables. Furthermore, because the vulnerability requires authentication as an organization user, it represents an insider threat scenario where compromised credentials or malicious insiders with legitimate access levels can escalate their privileges. The ability to read arbitrary database content undermines the confidentiality guarantees expected by enterprise customers and may violate regulatory compliance requirements such as GDPR or HIPAA depending on the data types involved.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary fix involves upgrading Lotus to a version greater than 0.10.2 where this input validation issue has been resolved through proper parameterization of SQL queries. Until an upgrade is feasible, administrators should implement strict input validation rules that reject any special characters or SQL keywords in metric property names and categorical filters at the application layer. Additionally, deploying a Web Application Firewall with specific signatures for SQL injection patterns can provide a temporary buffer against exploitation attempts. From a defensive posture perspective, organizations should enforce least-privilege database access controls to limit what an authenticated user account can query, thereby reducing the blast radius of any successful injection attempt. Regular security audits and static code analysis focused on template engine usage are also recommended to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future development cycles. This incident aligns with ATT&CK technique T1190, Exploit Public-Facing Application, as it leverages a flaw in an internet-accessible service to achieve unauthorized data access through crafted inputs that bypass standard authentication boundaries via logic manipulation rather than credential theft alone.