CVE-2026-120729 in Giteainfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/15/2026

The popup shown when hovering an issue reference loaded its data from the path of the hovered link and inserted part of the response as HTML. A user who can post a comment or other rendered content could add a link that is displayed as an ordinary issue reference but points to a file in a repository they control, so that the popup inserted that file's content into the page of anyone hovering the link and ran script in the viewer's session. The popup now requests the issue by the owner, repository and index parsed from the link.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/15/2026

This vulnerability represents a critical cross-site scripting flaw rooted in improper input validation and insecure data handling within the user interface layer of the application. Specifically, the mechanism responsible for displaying hover-based popups over issue references failed to sanitize or validate the source of the content being rendered. When a user hovers their mouse cursor over an element identified as an issue reference, the frontend logic dynamically fetches associated metadata and displays it in a tooltip-style overlay. The critical failure occurred because this popup component constructed its HTML payload by directly inserting parts of the server response into the DOM without adequate escaping or context-aware encoding. This architectural oversight allowed attackers to manipulate the data source itself rather than just injecting malicious scripts through standard text fields, bypassing traditional input validation controls that typically target comment bodies or title fields.

The exploitation vector relies on social engineering and repository control dynamics within a collaborative development environment. An attacker with the ability to post comments or other rendered content can craft a link that visually appears as a legitimate reference to an issue number but actually points to a file path in a repository under their direct control. By leveraging this deceptive linking strategy, the victim is led to believe they are viewing standard project metadata. However, when the victim hovers over this maliciously crafted link, the application triggers the popup mechanism which retrieves data from the attacker-controlled endpoint instead of the internal issue tracker database. Because the response content was treated as trusted HTML and injected directly into the page structure without sanitization, any script tags or event handlers embedded within that external file are executed in the context of the victim's active session.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, primarily due to its potential for account takeover and data exfiltration. Since the malicious scripts execute with the same privileges as the logged-in user, an attacker can steal sensitive authentication tokens, such as session cookies or API keys stored in local storage. This capability allows the adversary to impersonate the victim within the application, gaining unauthorized access to private repositories, source code, and confidential project discussions. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary JavaScript enables more sophisticated attacks, including keylogging, form hijacking on external sites if same-origin policies are bypassed via specific browser configurations, or redirecting users to phishing pages designed to harvest credentials from other services where the user is authenticated.

To mitigate this risk and prevent similar vulnerabilities in future iterations, developers must implement strict content security policies that restrict inline script execution and define explicit sources for dynamic content loading. The frontend logic should be refactored to ensure that all data retrieved from external or untrusted endpoints is parsed as plain text rather than raw HTML before being displayed. Additionally, implementing a allowlist approach for issue reference parsing ensures that only links pointing to internal, verified repositories are processed by the hover popup mechanism. Input validation must occur at multiple layers, including server-side sanitization of all incoming data and client-side encoding of any dynamic content injected into the DOM. These measures align with CWE-79, which classifies this as an improper neutralization of input during web page generation, commonly known as cross-site scripting. From a threat modeling perspective using MITRE ATT&CK techniques, this vulnerability facilitates T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter execution within the browser environment, allowing for subsequent data exfiltration via T1005 Data from Local System or credential theft through T1078 Valid Accounts.

Responsible

Gitea

Reservation

11/15/2026

Disclosure

11/15/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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