CVE-2026-129493 in Bolo
Summary
by MITRE • 11/16/2026
Bolo (bolo-solo) 1.7 through 2.6.4 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read article view passwords via the public GET /articles endpoint. Attackers can retrieve the plaintext articleViewPwd field returned by ArticleProcessor.getArticlesByPage and submit it to read password-protected article content.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026
The Bolo application, specifically versions 1.7 through 2.6.4, contains a critical information disclosure vulnerability that stems from improper access control mechanisms within its public API endpoints. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass intended security restrictions and extract sensitive data directly from the server response without requiring valid credentials or authentication tokens. The core of this issue lies in the implementation of the GET /articles endpoint, which is designed to serve article content but fails to adequately filter out protected fields when processing requests for articles that are marked as password-protected.
Technically, the vulnerability exploits a logic error within the ArticleProcessor.getArticlesByPage method. When an attacker queries this public endpoint with specific parameters targeting articles designated as private or restricted, the backend processes the request and constructs a response object containing article metadata and content details. Crucially, while the application correctly restricts access to the actual protected body of these articles for unauthenticated users, it inadvertently includes the plaintext value of the articleViewPwd field in the JSON payload returned by the API. This means that instead of returning null or omitting the password hash entirely when access is denied, the system leaks the exact string required to authenticate and view the content.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe because it effectively neutralizes the intended security controls for protected articles. An attacker does not need to perform complex cryptographic attacks such as brute-forcing hashes or exploiting weak encryption algorithms; they simply retrieve the plaintext password from a single HTTP response. Once obtained, this credential can be submitted directly to the appropriate authentication endpoint or used within the application interface to bypass all access restrictions and read sensitive article content that was intended to remain private. This represents a classic case of security through obscurity failing due to poor data handling practices in API responses.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information, although it is more accurately described as CWE-284: Improper Access Control leading to information leakage via exposed fields. In the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior corresponds to T1530: Data from Cloud Storage Objects or potentially T1005: Data from Local System depending on where Bolo stores its data, as it involves exfiltrating sensitive data through an application interface without proper authorization checks. The root cause is a failure in the server-side logic to sanitize output based on the user's authentication status and the sensitivity of the requested resource attributes.
To mitigate this vulnerability, developers must implement strict input validation and output encoding practices that ensure no sensitive fields are included in API responses unless the requesting entity has verified authorization for those specific data points. The ArticleProcessor.getArticlesByPage function should be refactored to check user permissions before serializing any part of the article object into JSON. If a field like articleViewPwd is required only for administrative purposes or post-authentication views, it must be explicitly excluded from public-facing responses. Additionally, implementing comprehensive logging and monitoring can help detect unusual patterns of requests targeting protected articles, providing an early warning system for potential exploitation attempts while patches are being deployed.