CVE-2026-124759 in P-Net
Summary
by MITRE • 11/13/2026
P-Net before 1.0.4 routes a received RTA alarm frame to an Application Relationship using only the destination alarm reference in the frame, without checking the source of the frame. A host with ADJACENT network access can abort an established Application Relationship with a single alarm ERROR frame, or deliver forged alarm notifications with chosen type, slot, subslot, USI and payload to the application.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026
The vulnerability identified in P-Net versions prior to 1.0.4 represents a critical failure in message authentication and source validation within industrial control system communications. Specifically, the protocol implementation routes received Real-Time Alarm (RTA) frames based exclusively on the destination alarm reference contained within the frame header. This design decision neglects any verification of the packet's origin or sender identity. In networked environments where P-Net is deployed for real-time data exchange between field devices and controllers, this lack of source validation creates a significant attack surface that can be exploited by adversaries with adjacent network access to manipulate critical operational states without authorization.
From a technical perspective, the flaw lies in the absence of integrity checks regarding who initiated the alarm signal. The system accepts any frame that matches an existing application relationship's destination reference, regardless of whether it originates from a legitimate device or an unauthorized host. This allows for two primary modes of exploitation: denial of service and data injection. An attacker can send a single forged RTA ERROR frame to abruptly terminate an established Application Relationship, effectively causing a disruption in the communication link between industrial components. Alternatively, the attacker can inject fabricated alarm notifications containing arbitrary values for type, slot, subslot, Unique System Identifier (USI), and payload fields. This capability enables the manipulation of system status reports and potentially triggers incorrect automated responses based on false premises.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe in industrial automation contexts where reliability and safety are paramount. The ability to abort an established application relationship can lead to immediate process interruptions, resulting in production downtime or unsafe operating conditions if critical monitoring functions are disabled. Furthermore, the delivery of forged alarm notifications poses a risk of misleading operators and automated control systems about the actual state of equipment. For instance, injecting false error codes for specific slots or subslots could trigger unnecessary maintenance procedures or mask genuine faults by flooding the system with noise, thereby degrading situational awareness and potentially leading to catastrophic failures if critical alarms are ignored amidst fabricated ones.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-287, which describes Improper Authentication, as the system fails to verify the identity of the sender before processing sensitive control messages. It also relates to CWE-345, Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, since the integrity and origin of the RTA frame are not validated against trusted sources. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this exploit maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts or Legitimate Access, as it leverages legitimate network access privileges to inject malicious commands into a protocol that assumes trust based on destination addressing alone. It also reflects aspects of T1496, Resource Hijacking, by disrupting the availability of application relationships and consuming system resources through forged traffic.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing strict source validation mechanisms within the P-Net stack. Developers should update to version 1.0.4 or later, where this logic has been corrected to verify the sender's identity against a whitelist of authorized devices before routing alarm frames. In environments where immediate patching is not feasible, network segmentation and access control lists (ACLs) can be employed to restrict RTA traffic to only known and trusted IP addresses or MAC addresses. Additionally, implementing cryptographic authentication for P-Net messages would provide robust protection against forgery by ensuring that every frame includes a digital signature or message authentication code that validates both the content and the source of the transmission.