CVE-2026-126271 in NocoDBinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/13/2026

NocoDB before 2026.09.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows authenticated base Viewers to obtain TLS client private keys by reading a base's data source. The source read handler masked only the connection password, letting attackers retrieve the decrypted private key, client certificate and CA to connect directly to the external database, bypassing NocoDB permissions.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026

The vulnerability identified in versions of NocoDB prior to 2026.09.0 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms regarding sensitive credential management within data source configurations. This flaw specifically impacts authenticated users who hold the Viewer role, which is typically intended to provide read-only access to database views without exposing underlying infrastructure details. The core technical deficiency lies in the implementation of the source read handler, which was designed to mask or obfuscate connection passwords for security purposes but failed to apply similar protections to other critical components of the TLS client authentication configuration. Consequently, when a Viewer requests data source information through standard API endpoints or interface interactions, the system returns the full plaintext contents of the private key, the associated client certificate, and the Certificate Authority (CA) bundle required to establish secure connections. This behavior constitutes an Information Disclosure vulnerability where sensitive cryptographic material is exposed to unauthorized parties despite their limited privilege level.

From a technical perspective, this issue stems from incomplete sanitization logic within the backend service that handles data source metadata retrieval. While password fields were correctly masked using asterisks or null values, other fields containing PEM-encoded private keys and certificates were left in clear text format. This oversight allows an attacker to extract these cryptographic assets directly from the application's response payload without needing to exploit any complex injection techniques or bypass authentication mechanisms beyond standard login credentials. The presence of a valid TLS client certificate and its corresponding private key effectively grants the ability to impersonate the NocoDB service itself when connecting to external databases, as many database systems rely on mutual TLS (mTLS) for strong identity verification rather than simple username-password pairs.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe because it enables privilege escalation from a low-privilege Viewer account to full administrative access over connected data sources. By obtaining the decrypted private key and client certificate, an attacker can bypass NocoDB’s internal permission layers entirely and connect directly to the underlying external database using standard TLS tools such as OpenSSL or database clients like psql or mysql. This direct connection circumvents all audit logs, row-level security policies, and column-level restrictions enforced by NocoDB, allowing the attacker to read, modify, or delete data with whatever permissions are granted at the database level for that specific client certificate. In environments where these certificates have broad privileges due to misconfiguration or legacy practices, this can lead to complete compromise of sensitive business data stored in PostgreSQL, MySQL, or other supported databases.

This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-200: Information Exposure and CWE-798: Use of Hardcoded Credentials if the keys were inadvertently committed to version control, though primarily it falls under CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration when considering the persistence of extracted credentials. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK mapping, this activity corresponds to T1005: Data from Local System and potentially T1078: Valid Accounts if the attacker leverages stolen Viewer credentials to perform the initial enumeration. The ability to extract TLS material also relates to T1552.004: Private Keys as it involves stealing cryptographic keys for lateral movement or direct access.

Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching of NocoDB to version 2026.09.0 or later, where the source read handler has been updated to mask all sensitive TLS components including private keys and certificates alongside passwords. In addition to upgrading software organizations should enforce strict least-privilege principles by ensuring that Viewer roles do not have access to data source configuration endpoints unless absolutely necessary for operational troubleshooting. It is also critical to rotate any compromised credentials immediately, as the exposure of client certificates may allow ongoing unauthorized access even after patching if old keys remain valid on the database server. Implementing network-level controls such as IP whitelisting for database connections and using separate service accounts with minimal permissions can further reduce the blast radius in case future vulnerabilities are discovered. Regular audits of data source configurations should be conducted to ensure that no sensitive cryptographic material is inadvertently exposed through API responses or UI elements accessible to lower-privileged users.

Responsible

VulnCheck

Reservation

11/10/2026

Disclosure

11/13/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00233

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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