CVE-2026-126293 in NocoDB
Summary
by MITRE • 11/13/2026
NocoDB before 2026.06.2 contains an attachment size limit bypass that allows authenticated Editor users to store oversized files because data-attachment-v3.service.ts trusts the remote server's advertised content length. Attackers can point the v3 upload-by-URL endpoint at a server that understates or omits its length to exhaust disk space or storage quota.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026
The vulnerability identified in NocoDB versions prior to 2026.06.2 represents a critical failure in input validation and resource management, specifically within the attachment handling subsystem. This flaw allows authenticated users with Editor privileges to bypass intended file size restrictions by exploiting how the application processes metadata from remote sources during URL-based uploads. The core technical issue resides in the data-attachment-v3.service.ts module, which is responsible for managing attachments via its v3 API endpoints. When a user initiates an upload using the upload-by-URL feature, the system fetches file details from the specified remote server to determine attributes such as filename and size before storing them locally. The critical defect lies in the application's unconditional trust of the Content-Length header provided by the external source without performing independent verification or applying local limits effectively.
This lack of validation creates a direct path for resource exhaustion attacks. An attacker can configure a malicious remote server to respond with an artificially low, zero, or missing Content-Length header while streaming significantly larger data payloads. Because NocoDB relies on this advertised length rather than monitoring the actual bytes received during the transfer process, it fails to trigger its internal size limits. Consequently, the application proceeds to write the entire payload to disk regardless of its true magnitude. This behavior effectively neutralizes any configured storage quotas or maximum attachment sizes defined by administrators, allowing an attacker to consume unlimited server resources provided they have Editor access and can control or manipulate a remote URL endpoint.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe in terms of availability and system integrity. By repeatedly uploading oversized files through this bypass mechanism, an attacker can rapidly exhaust the disk space on the host machine running NocoDB. This leads to a denial-of-service condition where legitimate users are unable to access the application or save new records due to insufficient storage. In environments with strict database constraints or limited cloud storage quotas, such as AWS S3 buckets connected via integration, this attack can also result in unexpected financial costs and service interruptions caused by quota overages. The vulnerability primarily affects systems that rely on URL-based file imports for collaboration workflows, making it particularly dangerous in enterprise settings where users frequently share external links to documents or media files.
From a classification perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write and CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. It also maps to the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1496: Resource Hijacking, as it involves using system resources for unintended purposes that degrade service availability. The attack vector is classified under Remote Code Execution implications in terms of impact, though technically it is a Denial of Service via resource exhaustion rather than arbitrary code execution. To mitigate this risk, organizations must upgrade to NocoDB version 2026.06.2 or later where the issue has been addressed by implementing strict local validation of file sizes independent of remote headers. Until an upgrade is performed, administrators should restrict Editor privileges to only those users who absolutely require them and consider placing a reverse proxy in front of the application that enforces maximum payload size limits at the network level. Additionally, monitoring disk usage patterns for anomalous spikes can help detect ongoing exploitation attempts early enough to prevent total system failure.