CVE-2026-128337 in ExcelJS
Summary
by MITRE • 11/13/2026
ExcelJS through 4.4.0 contains a prototype pollution vulnerability in mergeConditionalFormattings that allows attackers to modify Object.prototype by supplying an x14:cfRule id of __proto__. Attackers can craft an xlsx file that, when loaded with xlsx.load(), sets properties such as type, direction, border and cfvo on every object in the process until it restarts.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026
The vulnerability identified within ExcelJS versions up to 4.4.0 represents a critical prototype pollution flaw located specifically within the mergeConditionalFormattings function. This security issue arises from inadequate input validation when processing external spreadsheet files, particularly those in the xlsx format. The core technical failure involves the library's handling of object properties during the merging process for conditional formatting rules. When an attacker crafts a malicious Excel file containing specific XML structures, they can inject property names that map directly to JavaScript’s internal prototype chain. Specifically, by setting the id attribute of an x14:cfRule element to _proto_, the application inadvertently treats this value as a directive to modify the global Object.prototype rather than treating it as a standard identifier for a formatting rule. This behavior is characteristic of insecure deserialization patterns where user-controlled input is used directly as object keys without sanitization or validation against reserved property names.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, extending beyond simple data corruption to potential denial of service and arbitrary code execution scenarios depending on the runtime environment. When a victim loads such a crafted file using xlsx.load(), the application iterates through the conditional formatting definitions and applies them via mergeConditionalFormattings. Due to the prototype pollution, properties such as type, direction, border, and cfvo are injected into Object.prototype. This means that every subsequent object created in the JavaScript process inherits these malformed or maliciously configured attributes. The persistence of this state within the running application can lead to unpredictable behavior across unrelated parts of the codebase that rely on standard object structures. In many cases, such widespread property injection causes critical failures in logic checks, serialization routines, and framework-specific operations, ultimately forcing the Node.js process to crash or restart due to unhandled exceptions or memory corruption issues triggered by the corrupted object states.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-1325, which covers Incorrectly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes, often referred to as JavaScript prototype pollution. It also relates closely to CWE-94, Improper Control of Generation of Code or Script, if the polluted properties are leveraged in subsequent code execution contexts. In terms of adversary tactics, this technique maps to ATT&CK T1562.001, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, as well as general reconnaissance and persistence mechanisms where an attacker might use prototype pollution to maintain a foothold or disrupt security monitoring tools running within the same process space. The attack vector is primarily remote via file upload if the application processes user-supplied Excel files without proper sanitization, making it particularly dangerous in web applications that allow document uploads for analysis or conversion.
Mitigation strategies must focus on strict input validation and secure coding practices to prevent prototype pollution at the source. Developers should implement a whitelist approach for allowed property names when merging objects, ensuring that keys like _proto_, constructor, and prototype are explicitly rejected before being used as object properties. Additionally, using Object.create(null) or Map data structures instead of plain JavaScript objects can mitigate this risk by removing the prototype chain entirely from the affected entities. Upgrading to a patched version of ExcelJS is essential, as newer releases have likely implemented safeguards against such injection vectors. Security teams should also consider implementing Content Security Policies and runtime application self-protection mechanisms that monitor for unexpected modifications to global object prototypes during execution. Regular security audits focusing on deserialization logic and third-party library dependencies are crucial to identifying similar vulnerabilities in other components of the software stack.