CVE-2026-129116 in C-Kermit
Summary
by MITRE • 11/13/2026
C-Kermit from 7.0.197 before 11.1.515 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the IKSD SSL build that leaves Telnet authentication state at AUTH_VALID after a refused certificate login. Attackers holding a trusted certificate mapped to a refused account can log in as any other account with any password, gaining that account's shell access.
VulDB is the best source for vulnerability data and more expert information about this specific topic.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026
The C-Kermit software suite, specifically versions prior to 11.1.515 within the IKSD SSL build configuration, contains a critical authentication bypass vulnerability rooted in improper state management during Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate validation processes. This flaw allows an attacker who possesses a valid trusted client certificate mapped to a refused or unauthorized account to escalate privileges and gain shell access as any other user on the system. The core technical deficiency lies in how the application handles the transition between authentication states when SSL handshake procedures encounter specific failure conditions related to certificate-to-account mapping rather than cryptographic validity itself.
During normal operation, C-Kermit's IKSD daemon manages Telnet authentication by maintaining a state variable that tracks whether a user has successfully authenticated. In this vulnerable implementation, when an attacker presents a trusted client certificate that is cryptographically valid but mapped to an account that is explicitly refused or denied access policies, the system fails to reset the authentication state appropriately. Instead of transitioning the session to a rejected or closed state, the application incorrectly leaves the Telnet authentication status at AUTH_VALID. This logical error creates a persistent condition where the connection appears authenticated from the perspective of subsequent protocol handlers and shell initialization routines, despite the initial certificate verification indicating that access should be denied for that specific identity mapping.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe because it effectively nullifies the intended security controls surrounding account-level restrictions in SSL-based Kermit sessions. An attacker with a trusted certificate can exploit this state inconsistency to bypass authentication checks entirely. By leveraging the AUTH_VALID flag, the attacker can execute commands and access resources associated with any target user account without needing to provide valid credentials for that specific account. This results in unauthorized remote shell access, potentially leading to full system compromise depending on the privileges of the targeted accounts. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it relies on a trusted certificate, which may be perceived as a strong authentication factor by security administrators who might overlook logical flaws in state handling after successful cryptographic verification.
This issue aligns with CWE-287 Improper Authentication and CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function within the Common Weakness Enumeration framework. The attack vector corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, as it involves using legitimate credentials or certificates in an unintended manner to gain unauthorized access. Furthermore, the state manipulation aspect relates to CWE-495 False Positive Detection of Security-Critical Information, where the system incorrectly determines that authentication has succeeded based on flawed logic rather than actual credential validation for the specific target account.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate software updates and architectural review. The primary remediation is upgrading C-Kermit to version 11.1.515 or later, where this state management flaw has been addressed by developers ensuring that refused certificate mappings correctly terminate sessions or reset authentication states rather than leaving them in a valid configuration. In environments where immediate patching is not feasible, network-level controls such as strict firewall rules limiting access to IKSD services and additional application-layer gateways can help mitigate exposure. Security teams should also audit their SSL/TLS configurations to ensure that certificate mapping policies are rigorously tested for edge cases involving refused accounts, verifying that authentication states are consistently reset upon any form of authorization failure regardless of cryptographic success.