CVE-2026-129134 in MRBS
Summary
by MITRE • 11/13/2026
MRBS before 1.13.0 contains a password reset poisoning vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to redirect reset links by forging the Host header when $url_base is unset. Attackers can request a reset for a victim so AuthDb::notifyUser() emails a link pointing to their host, capturing the reset key when opened to take over accounts including administrators.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/13/2026
The vulnerability identified in MRBS versions prior to 1.13.0 represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper validation of user-supplied input within the password reset mechanism. Specifically, this is an HTTP Host Header Injection issue that leads to credential poisoning and subsequent account takeover. The core technical failure occurs when the application constructs URLs for password recovery emails without properly sanitizing or validating the Host header provided by the client request. In web applications, the Host header is a standard part of HTTP requests used to identify the domain name of the server. However, developers sometimes rely on this header dynamically to construct absolute URLs for links embedded in system-generated emails, such as password reset tokens. When the configuration variable $url_base is unset or not explicitly defined by the administrator, the application defaults to deriving the base URL from the Host header sent with the request. This design choice creates a significant trust boundary violation because it assumes that any incoming HTTP request originates from a legitimate client accessing the correct domain, rather than recognizing that an attacker can manipulate this header during their own interaction with the system.
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this flaw by initiating a password reset for a specific victim account while simultaneously crafting a malicious HTTP request where the Host header is set to a server under the attacker's control. When MRBS processes this request, it generates a password reset link that incorporates the forged host value instead of the legitimate application domain. Consequently, when the system sends the notification email via AuthDb::notifyUser(), the embedded URL points to the attacker’s malicious site rather than the official login portal. This technique effectively poisons the data flow between the server and the end-user, leveraging the victim's trust in the email content while bypassing any client-side security controls like Content Security Policy since the redirection happens at the network level before the browser renders the page.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it facilitates complete account compromise without requiring prior authentication or knowledge of the victim’s current credentials. Once the victim receives the phishing-style email containing the poisoned reset link and clicks on it, they are directed to a malicious interface controlled by the attacker. This interface captures the password reset token generated by MRBS for that specific user session. With possession of this valid cryptographic key, the attacker can proceed to set a new password for the targeted account. Since MRBS is often deployed in educational or institutional settings where administrative privileges may be held by staff with access to sensitive data, gaining control over an administrator account through this method allows the attacker to escalate their privileges further, potentially leading to broader system compromise, data exfiltration, and disruption of services.
This vulnerability aligns closely with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories such as CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site Open Redirect and CWE-284 Improper Access Control, specifically regarding the failure to validate input used in security-critical operations like authentication flows. From a MITRE ATT&CK perspective, this attack vector maps to T1534 Internal Spearphishing, as it involves tricking an internal user into interacting with malicious content delivered via email, and potentially T1078 Valid Accounts if the attacker uses the compromised credentials for lateral movement or persistence within the network. The exploitation relies on social engineering elements combined with technical manipulation of HTTP headers to bypass standard authentication checks.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The most effective solution is to upgrade MRBS to version 1.13.0 or later, where this logic has been corrected to ensure that password reset links always point to the configured base URL regardless of the Host header value. For environments unable to patch immediately due to operational constraints, administrators should explicitly define the $url_base configuration parameter in the application settings. By hardcoding the correct domain and protocol for the web application, the system will no longer rely on dynamic host detection from incoming requests, thereby neutralizing the injection vector. Additionally, implementing strict input validation on all HTTP headers used in URL construction can provide an additional layer of defense. Security teams should also monitor logs for unusual patterns in password reset requests originating from unexpected IP addresses or containing anomalous Host header values to detect potential exploitation attempts in real-time.