CVE-2026-13257 in DataPower Gateway
Summary
by MITRE • 10/08/2026
IBM DataPower Gateway 10.5.0.0 through 10.5.0.22, 10.6.1 through 10.6.6, 10.6.0.0 through 10.6.0.10, and 11.0.0.0 through 11.0.0.2 could allow an authenticated user to forge signature requests due to improper verification of data authenticity.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/08/2026
The vulnerability identified in IBM DataPower Gateway versions ranging from 10.5.0.0 through 10.5.0.22, 10.6.1 through 10.6.6, and specific releases within the 10.6.0.x and 11.0.0.x series represents a critical flaw in the application's cryptographic validation logic. This issue is classified under CWE-347, which denotes Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature. The core technical deficiency lies in the gateway's failure to rigorously validate the integrity and authenticity of digital signatures associated with incoming requests before processing them. In standard secure communications, particularly those involving XML Digital Signatures or similar cryptographic mechanisms used by DataPower for message routing and transformation, the system must verify that the signature corresponds exactly to the signed content and has not been altered in transit. The flaw allows an attacker who possesses valid authentication credentials to manipulate request payloads while retaining a previously generated, yet now invalid, digital signature. Because the verification process is bypassed or executed incorrectly, the gateway accepts these tampered requests as legitimate, effectively treating forged data with the same trust level as authentic data.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability significantly undermines the non-repudiation and integrity guarantees that IBM DataPower Gateway provides to enterprise architectures. Since authentication alone does not prevent signature forgery in this context, a compromised or malicious insider user can alter critical parameters within API requests, SOAP messages, or other supported protocols without detection by the gateway's security controls. This capability enables severe downstream consequences including data injection attacks where an attacker modifies transaction amounts, changes destination endpoints to redirect sensitive information to unauthorized servers, or alters business logic rules embedded in the message payload. The impact is particularly acute for organizations relying on DataPower as a central hub for service-oriented architecture interactions, as it allows attackers to bypass integrity checks that are typically enforced at this network perimeter layer. This effectively neutralizes one of the primary security benefits of using an API gateway designed specifically for secure mediation and policy enforcement.
The exploitation vector aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1588.002, which involves obtaining cryptographic keys through vulnerability discovery or improper implementation flaws that allow signature bypassing without necessarily stealing private keys directly. While the attacker requires initial authentication to access the system, the ability to forge signatures elevates their privilege from a standard user to an entity capable of manipulating secure communications undetected by integrity monitoring tools. This scenario highlights a critical gap in defense-in-depth strategies where reliance on network-level authentication is insufficient when application-layer cryptographic verification fails. The vulnerability persists across multiple major releases because it likely stems from a fundamental architectural decision or code path shared across the product line regarding how signature validation hooks are invoked during message processing pipelines.
Mitigation for this vulnerability requires immediate action to ensure that all instances of IBM DataPower Gateway within affected version ranges are updated to the latest fixed release provided by IBM Security. Organizations should prioritize patching systems exposed to internal networks where authenticated users might have access, as well as external-facing gateways if any such configurations exist with weak authentication controls. In addition to applying vendor-supplied patches, security teams should review logging and monitoring capabilities to detect anomalies in signature validation failures or unexpected message content variations that may indicate attempted exploitation. Implementing additional layers of verification at the application layer, such as validating business logic constraints independently of gateway-level signatures, can provide compensating controls until full remediation is achieved. Regular audits of cryptographic implementation practices across all integrated services are also recommended to identify similar weaknesses in other components of the enterprise security infrastructure.