CVE-2026-17576 in InfiniteWP Client Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 09/18/2026
The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox => $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the 'iwp_get_comments_' prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb->get_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin's WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/18/2026
The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress, specifically in versions up to 1.13.9, contains a critical SQL injection vulnerability within its comment management functionality. This flaw is located in the get_comments action and stems from insufficient input validation and sanitization of array keys provided in JSON request bodies. The vulnerability arises because the application processes user-supplied data without properly escaping it before incorporating it into database queries. An attacker with administrator-level access can exploit this weakness to execute arbitrary SQL commands, potentially leading to unauthorized data extraction or modification.
The technical root cause lies in how the plugin handles arguments passed via JSON-encoded POST requests. The function IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments first calls extract() on the $args array, which silently ignores keys that are not valid PHP variable names. However, a subsequent loop iterates over every key in the original $args array regardless of validity. It strips a specific prefix using str_replace(), wraps the remaining string in single quotes, and then implodes these values into an IN clause for a SQL query executed via $wpdb->get_results(). Crucially, this execution occurs without the use of WordPress's prepare() function, which is designed to safely escape data before insertion into SQL statements.
Because the request body is read directly from php://input and decoded as JSON, standard WordPress sanitization functions like wp_magic_quotes() are bypassed entirely. This means that special characters such as single quotes in the array keys pass through unaltered. When these unchecked values are embedded into the SQL query string, they can be used to break out of the intended context. For instance, an attacker could supply a key containing a quote followed by malicious SQL syntax, effectively appending additional queries to the existing statement. This allows for blind or error-based SQL injection attacks depending on how the database responds to malformed input.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the authentication requirements and access levels involved. Exploitation requires an attacker to have administrator-level privileges within WordPress. However, since administrators can register their own public keys via the add_site function using plugin-generated activation keys, a compromised or malicious admin account provides sufficient authority to craft signed get_comments requests containing injection payloads. Successful exploitation enables attackers to extract sensitive information from the database, including user credentials, configuration details, and other proprietary data stored by the WordPress installation.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (SQL Injection). The failure to properly sanitize input before its use in dynamic query construction is a classic example of this category. Furthermore, according to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this exploit technique falls under T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter or more specifically relates to data exfiltration techniques where structured queries are manipulated to retrieve unauthorized information from backend databases.
Mitigation strategies should focus on immediate patching and defensive coding practices. The primary remediation is to upgrade the InfiniteWP Client plugin to a version that addresses this flaw, ensuring that all inputs used in SQL constructs are properly escaped using prepared statements or equivalent safe database interaction methods provided by WordPress. Developers must ensure that extract() does not bypass validation logic and that all dynamic components of SQL queries undergo rigorous sanitization regardless of their source format. Additionally, implementing strict input validation on JSON keys can prevent unexpected characters from entering the processing pipeline. Security teams should also monitor for unusual query patterns in database logs indicative of injection attempts and enforce least-privilege principles to limit the impact if an administrator account is compromised.