CVE-2026-67100 in BigFix Service Management
Summary
by MITRE • 09/18/2026
HCL BigFix Service Management is affected by SQL Injection flaw and a Cross-Tenant Data Exposure flaw vulnerabilities. which could allow an authenticated attacker to inject database commands to extract sensitive system details, as well as manipulate request values to gain unauthorized access to full personal profile data and PII across different organizations.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/18/2026
The HCL BigFix Service Management platform contains critical security deficiencies that compromise the integrity of its underlying relational database infrastructure and enforce insufficient isolation mechanisms between distinct organizational tenants. These vulnerabilities stem from inadequate input validation and improper sanitization procedures within the application layer, allowing malicious actors to exploit weakly constructed SQL queries and flawed access control logic. The presence of these flaws indicates a fundamental gap in secure coding practices during the development lifecycle, specifically regarding how user-supplied data is processed before being executed against the backend database or used to determine resource visibility boundaries.
The first major vulnerability involves an SQL Injection flaw that permits authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary Structured Query Language commands into application inputs. By manipulating parameters such as search queries, filter options, or authentication tokens, a malicious actor can bypass intended query logic and execute unauthorized database operations. This capability allows the attacker to extract sensitive system details including schema information, table structures, stored procedures, and potentially confidential data residing within the database. The exploitation of this flaw relies on the application's failure to properly distinguish between code and data when processing user input, a classic error that leads to direct manipulation of the backend storage layer. This aligns with CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command which is widely recognized as one of the most dangerous web application vulnerabilities due to its potential for complete database compromise.
The second significant vulnerability pertains to Cross-Tenant Data Exposure, a severe flaw related to broken access control mechanisms. In multi-tenant environments like HCL BigFix Service Management, strict logical separation must be maintained between different organizations or tenants sharing the same infrastructure. However, vulnerabilities in this area allow an authenticated user from one tenant to manipulate request values such as identifiers or session tokens to gain unauthorized access to data belonging to other tenants. This includes full personal profile data and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of users within those external organizations. The root cause typically involves the application relying on client-side controls for security decisions rather than enforcing strict server-side validation, or failing to properly scope database queries with tenant-specific identifiers during every operation.
The operational impact of these combined vulnerabilities is substantial, posing severe risks to data confidentiality and regulatory compliance. An attacker leveraging the SQL Injection flaw can perform reconnaissance to map out the entire system architecture and extract sensitive configuration details that facilitate further attacks. Simultaneously, exploitation of the Cross-Tenant Data Exposure flaw results in a massive breach of privacy, exposing PII such as names, contact information, employment history, and other personal attributes across multiple organizations. This level of data leakage can lead to significant financial penalties under regulations like GDPR or HIPAA, reputational damage for HCL and its customers, and potential identity theft against affected individuals. The ability to access full profiles across tenants suggests a systemic failure in the platform's multi-tenancy architecture rather than an isolated incident.
Mitigation strategies must address both the immediate technical flaws and broader architectural security postures. Immediate remediation involves applying vendor-provided patches that correct the input validation logic for SQL queries, ensuring all user inputs are parameterized or strictly sanitized before database execution. For the cross-tenant exposure issue, developers must implement rigorous server-side access control checks that verify tenant ownership for every data retrieval operation, regardless of client-supplied identifiers. Additionally, implementing a Web Application Firewall can provide an additional layer of defense by detecting and blocking common SQL injection patterns and anomalous request structures indicative of multi-tenancy bypass attempts. Long-term improvements should include adopting secure development lifecycle practices such as static application security testing to catch these issues early in the coding phase and conducting regular penetration tests focused on access control logic and database interaction integrity.
These vulnerabilities map directly to specific entries within established cybersecurity frameworks that guide risk assessment and remediation prioritization. The SQL Injection flaw corresponds to CWE-89, while the cross-tenant data exposure aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-1004 Sensitive Data Without Proper Protection. From an offensive security perspective as defined by MITRE ATT&CK, these flaws facilitate techniques such as T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application for initial access via SQL injection and T1530 Data from Cloud Storage or Object Storage if the data is exfiltrated to external locations, though primarily they represent a failure in Access Control (TA0004) leading to Unauthorized Access (T1078). Organizations utilizing HCL BigFix Service Management should prioritize patching these vulnerabilities immediately and review their internal access control policies to ensure no residual risks remain regarding tenant isolation.