CVE-2026-24168 in Unified Fabric Manager
Summary
by MITRE • 08/25/2026
NVIDIA UFM Enterprise contains a vulnerability in the IBDiagnet API where an authenticated attacker with administrative privileges may cause command injection by sending crafted API requests. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to code execution, escalation of privileges and information disclosure.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/25/2026
The identified security flaw resides within the InfiniBand Diagnostics (IBDiag) Application Programming Interface of NVIDIA UFM Enterprise software. This component is responsible for managing and diagnosing InfiniBand network infrastructure, a critical layer in high-performance computing environments where reliability and performance are paramount. The vulnerability specifically affects authenticated users who possess administrative privileges, indicating that while the attack surface requires initial access to an account with elevated rights, the severity of the potential impact remains critically high due to the level of control such accounts typically hold over system configurations and network topology data.
The technical nature of this flaw is classified as command injection, a vulnerability type formally recognized under CWE-78 in the Common Weakness Enumeration standard. This occurs when software constructs operating system commands using input that has been supplied by an attacker without proper validation or sanitization. In the context of NVIDIA UFM Enterprise, crafted API requests sent to the IBDiag endpoint allow an adversary to inject arbitrary shell commands into the execution pipeline. Because the underlying process likely runs with elevated privileges to perform deep network diagnostics and configuration changes, these injected commands are executed within that privileged context rather than in a restricted sandboxed environment.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability enables several severe consequences for affected organizations. The most immediate risk is remote code execution, allowing attackers to run arbitrary programs on the host system running UFM Enterprise. This can lead directly to privilege escalation if the application does not strictly adhere to least-privilege principles during command execution, potentially granting full control over the underlying operating system. Furthermore, information disclosure becomes a significant concern as an attacker could leverage this access to exfiltrate sensitive network topology data, configuration files containing credentials or encryption keys, and logs that reveal internal infrastructure details. This compromises both confidentiality and integrity of the enterprise network management plane.
The exploitation path aligns with techniques observed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, particularly those involving command and script interpretation within managed environments. Attackers may utilize this vector to establish persistence, move laterally across the data center fabric by manipulating switch configurations via injected commands, or disrupt service availability through destructive operations on network devices. The ability to manipulate InfiniBand switches remotely represents a critical risk for industries relying on low-latency interconnects such as financial trading platforms, artificial intelligence clusters, and supercomputing facilities.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching of NVIDIA UFM Enterprise to the latest version where this vulnerability has been addressed by the vendor. In addition to software updates, organizations should enforce strict access controls ensuring that administrative API keys are rotated regularly and stored securely using hardware security modules or dedicated secret management solutions. Network segmentation is also recommended to isolate the UFM management plane from general corporate networks, limiting lateral movement opportunities if an account is compromised. Input validation on any custom integrations interacting with the IBDiag API should be implemented as a defense-in-depth measure, although reliance solely on application-level filtering is insufficient given the server-side nature of this flaw. Continuous monitoring for anomalous API call patterns and command execution logs can aid in early detection of exploitation attempts before significant damage occurs.