CVE-2026-37071 in File Manager
Summary
by MITRE • 08/27/2026
Arbitrary File Rename Leading to Privilege Escalation in Actions::renameFile() function in Veno File Manager Project 4.4.9 allows an authenticated attacker with 'reanme' permission to take over the super administrator account via a specially crafted POST request to the affected endpoint renaming the application configuration file and triggering a rebuild of configuration and resetting super administrator credentials to default values.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/27/2026
The vulnerability identified in Veno File Manager Project version 4.4.9 represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper handling of file operations, specifically within the Actions::renameFile() function. This issue is classified under CWE-250, which denotes execution with unnecessary privileges, and more precisely aligns with CWE-732, involving incorrect permission assignment for essential functions. The core technical failure lies in the application's inability to validate or restrict the target path during a file rename operation performed by an authenticated user who possesses only basic renaming permissions. While the attacker is limited to specific functional rights within the interface, the underlying backend logic fails to enforce strict boundary checks on where files can be moved or renamed. This architectural oversight allows the manipulation of system-critical paths that are typically reserved for administrative operations, effectively bypassing the intended role-based access control mechanisms designed to isolate user-level actions from privileged system configurations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and directly leads to a complete compromise of the application's security posture through privilege escalation. By crafting a specific POST request targeting the rename endpoint with a carefully constructed payload, an authenticated attacker can redirect the file operation toward the application configuration file located in sensitive directories outside their authorized scope. The successful execution of this malicious rename action triggers an automatic rebuild or reload of the application configuration by the server process. Because the system assumes that any modification to its primary configuration files is legitimate and initiated by a trusted administrator, it proceeds with reloading these settings without additional verification. This behavior results in the super administrator account credentials being reset to their default values, which are widely known and easily exploitable. Consequently, an attacker who initially had only limited file management capabilities can escalate their privileges to that of a full system administrator, gaining unrestricted access to all data, user accounts, and backend functionalities managed by the application.
From a tactical perspective, this attack vector maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, specifically Valid Accounts, as it relies on legitimate credentials being misused for unauthorized privilege escalation. Furthermore, the mechanism of modifying configuration files to alter system behavior aligns with T1562, Impair Defenses, particularly through disabling or configuring reflective defenses such as authentication mechanisms. The exploitation does not require complex binary manipulation or memory corruption techniques but rather exploits logical flaws in path traversal and permission validation logic. This simplicity makes it highly accessible for automated scanning tools and opportunistic attackers who have already gained a foothold within the application via other means, such as weak password policies or session hijacking.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The most urgent step is to apply the vendor-provided patch that updates version 4.4.9 to fix the validation logic in the Actions::renameFile() function. Until a patch is available, administrators should restrict web server permissions so that the application process does not have write access to its own configuration files unless absolutely necessary for runtime operations. Implementing strict input validation on all file path parameters is critical; specifically, developers must enforce canonicalization of paths and verify that any target directory resides within an allowed whitelist relative to the user's home or upload directories. Additionally, implementing a secondary authentication challenge or administrative approval step for actions that affect global configuration files can provide a vital layer of defense against unauthorized modifications. Regular auditing of file system permissions and monitoring logs for unusual rename operations targeting sensitive paths will also aid in early detection and response to such exploitation attempts.