CVE-2026-46531 in Cacti
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2026
Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. From version 1.2.27 to before version 1.2.31, Cacti contains an authenticated stored second-order SQL injection in the automation tree rule item handler. A user holding the Automation realm (default General Administration role) can persist an arbitrary SQL fragment in the automation_tree_rule_items.field column. The fragment is later concatenated directly into a SELECT ... AS source FROM ... clause in lib/api_automation.php :: create_all_header_nodes() and executed when an administrator triggers automation via the standard graphs.php?action=actions&drp_action=8 ("Apply Automation Rules") bulk action. The result of the injected SELECT is written into graph_tree_items.title and rendered in the Cacti tree UI, providing a direct exfiltration channe. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.31.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/23/2026
Cacti serves as a widely deployed open-source network monitoring framework that relies on complex database interactions to manage performance data and fault management tasks. Within the specific versions ranging from 1.2.27 up to, but not including, version 1.2.31, a critical security flaw exists within the automation subsystem of the application. This vulnerability manifests as an authenticated stored second-order SQL injection located in the handler for automation tree rule items. The severity of this issue is compounded by its nature as a second-order injection, meaning that malicious input provided during one operation is not immediately exploited but rather persisted in the database and subsequently executed during a different, often unrelated, administrative action later in time.
The technical root cause lies in insufficient sanitization or parameterization of user-supplied data within the automation_tree_rule_items.field column. An attacker who possesses authentication credentials with at least the General Administration role, which grants access to the Automation realm by default, can inject arbitrary SQL fragments into this field. Because the input is stored directly without proper validation against a whitelist of allowed characters or structures, it remains dormant until triggered. The vulnerability becomes active when an administrator performs bulk actions via the graphs.php interface using the action parameter set to apply automation rules. Specifically, invoking drp_action=8 triggers the create_all_header_nodes function in lib/api_automation.php. This function constructs SQL queries by concatenating the stored field values directly into a SELECT ... AS source FROM ... clause without employing prepared statements or adequate escaping mechanisms.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential for data exfiltration and system compromise. When the maliciously crafted automation rule is executed, the injected SQL fragment runs within the context of the database user account used by Cacti. The result set generated by the arbitrary SELECT statement is then written into the graph_tree_items.title column. Since this title field is subsequently rendered in the Cacti tree user interface, any data retrieved via the injection can be displayed directly to the administrator viewing the dashboard. This creates a direct channel for exfiltrating sensitive information from the underlying database, such as credentials, configuration details, or other monitored network metrics. Furthermore, depending on the specific SQL syntax injected and the capabilities of the database engine, this could potentially lead to remote code execution if out-of-band techniques are employed or if the database allows shell access commands.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-89, which describes Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, commonly known as SQL Injection. The specific mechanism of storing malicious input for later execution classifies it under CWE-74, Inclusion of Functionally Unnecessary Code or Data, and more specifically reflects the pattern of Second-Order SQL Injection where the payload is stored first and executed later. From a threat intelligence perspective, this behavior maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059, Command and Scripting Interpreter, particularly when considering how an attacker might leverage database functions for broader system access, as well as T1005, Data from Local System, due to the direct exfiltration capability through the UI rendering.
To mitigate this risk, organizations running Cacti must immediately upgrade to version 1.2.31 or later where the issue has been patched by implementing proper input validation and using parameterized queries for all database interactions involving automation rules. For environments that cannot be upgraded instantly due to operational constraints, it is advisable to restrict access to the Automation realm strictly to trusted administrators with strong multi-factor authentication controls. Additionally, monitoring logs for unusual SQL query patterns or unexpected changes in graph tree titles can help detect potential exploitation attempts before significant damage occurs. Regular security audits of third-party plugins and custom scripts that interact with the Cacti API are also recommended to ensure no similar injection vectors exist elsewhere in the application logic.