CVE-2026-115570 in Electron
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2026
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 42.11.16, 43.8.1, 44.9.1, and 45.0.0-beta.6, Electron does not block compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates in Chromium networking, Node.js tls, Node.js https, or Node.js fetch. An attacker who holds a certificate issued through one of these intermediates and can intercept network traffic can impersonate a TLS server to an affected application. This issue is fixed in versions 42.11.16, 43.8.1, 44.9.1, and 45.0.0-beta.6.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/23/2026
The vulnerability described pertains to a critical failure in certificate validation within the Electron framework, specifically affecting versions prior to 42.11.16, 43.8.1, 44.9.1, and 45.0.0-beta.6. Electron relies on Chromium for its rendering engine and integrates Node.js for backend functionality, both of which handle network security protocols such as TLS. The core technical flaw lies in the application's inability to block compromised intermediate certificates issued by eMudhra. In a standard Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) ecosystem, certificate authorities issue root and intermediate certificates that form a chain of trust. When an intermediate CA is found to be compromised or misbehaving, security standards dictate that applications must immediately revoke trust in any certificates signed by that specific intermediary. However, the affected Electron versions failed to enforce this revocation check across Chromium networking components as well as Node.js modules including tls, https, and fetch APIs. This oversight means that the application continues to accept TLS connections authenticated with certificates derived from these compromised intermediates, effectively bypassing standard certificate pinning or validation logic designed to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, primarily enabling impersonation attacks against applications built on Electron. An attacker who possesses a valid certificate issued through one of the compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates can position themselves between the victim application and its intended server. By intercepting network traffic, typically via techniques such as ARP spoofing or DNS manipulation in untrusted networks like public Wi-Fi, the attacker can present their maliciously obtained certificate to the Electron-based application. Because the framework does not recognize the compromise of the issuing intermediate CA, it establishes a trusted TLS session with the attacker instead of the legitimate server. This allows for full decryption and inspection of encrypted traffic, including sensitive user data, authentication credentials, and proprietary information transmitted by the application. Furthermore, since this flaw affects multiple underlying libraries (Chromium, Node.js tls/https/fetch), the attack surface is broad, impacting any network communication handled by these modules within the application environment.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation and CWE-613 Insufficient Session Expiration or Revocation of Trust Certificates. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Man-in-the-Middle attacks, specifically T1078 Valid Accounts if the attacker leverages stolen credentials obtained through this interception, and potentially T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle for network sniffing and credential harvesting. The failure to check Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses against known compromised intermediates represents a significant deviation from secure coding practices recommended by industry standards such as NIST SP 800-52 regarding TLS implementation guidelines.
To mitigate this risk, organizations and developers must immediately upgrade Electron to version 42.11.16 or later, ensuring that all dependent components are updated to their respective patched versions (43.8.1 for the relevant branch, 44.9.1, and 45.0.0-beta.6). For applications where an immediate upgrade is not feasible due to compatibility constraints, implementing certificate pinning using public key hashes can provide a layer of defense independent of the CA trust store. This approach ensures that only specific certificates or keys are accepted by the application, regardless of whether intermediate CAs have been compromised. Additionally, developers should review their network security policies to ensure strict TLS configurations and consider deploying runtime application self-protection mechanisms that monitor for anomalous certificate chains during connection establishment. Regular audits of third-party dependencies and timely patching remain essential strategies to maintain integrity against evolving PKI threats.