CVE-2026-47493 in Virtual GPU Manager
Summary
by MITRE • 09/30/2026
NVIDIA vGPU software for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability in the GPU kernel driver where a guest may access privileged host GPU resources for which it is not authorized. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, denial of service, and information disclosure.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/30/2026
The identified vulnerability resides within the NVIDIA virtual GPU software stack, specifically affecting the kernel-mode driver components that operate on both Windows and Linux host systems. This security flaw stems from an improper access control mechanism inherent in how guest virtual machines interact with the underlying physical hardware resources managed by the hypervisor layer. In a typical virtualized environment, strict isolation boundaries are enforced to ensure that individual guests cannot interfere with one another or access sensitive host-level data structures. However, due to this specific implementation error, a malicious actor operating within a compromised guest VM can bypass these intended restrictions and directly interact with privileged GPU resources on the host system. This represents a critical failure in virtualization security boundaries, allowing unprivileged entities to execute operations that should be strictly reserved for trusted kernel-level processes or authorized administrative accounts.
From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns closely with CWE-269, which classifies Improper Privilege Control, and more specifically relates to CWE-787, an out-of-bounds write scenario where the guest attempts to access memory regions it does not own. The vulnerability likely involves insufficient validation of input parameters or missing checks on resource ownership before granting access to GPU command buffers or hardware registers. By exploiting this weakness, an attacker can manipulate the state of the host's graphics processing unit in ways that were never intended by the software architecture. This capability effectively breaks the isolation model provided by NVIDIA vGPU technology, turning a standard virtual machine into a potential pivot point for attacking the physical server hosting it.
The operational impact of successfully exploiting this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted. An attacker could achieve arbitrary code execution on the host system with kernel-level privileges, as GPU drivers typically run in ring 0 or equivalent high-privilege modes. This escalation allows for complete compromise of the underlying infrastructure, leading to data tampering where sensitive information stored on the host can be modified or exfiltrated. Furthermore, denial of service attacks become feasible by corrupting critical driver states or causing hardware faults that crash the entire system. Information disclosure is also a significant risk, as access to privileged GPU resources may reveal memory contents from other virtual machines running on the same physical server, potentially exposing proprietary algorithms, user credentials, or confidential business data belonging to different tenants in a multi-tenant cloud environment.
In terms of threat modeling and adversary behavior, this vulnerability maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1055, specifically Process Injection via DLL side-loading or direct kernel manipulation, as well as T1620 Reflection-based Execution if the exploit leverages loaded modules within the driver context. It also relates to T1499, Endpoint Denial of Service, through resource exhaustion techniques enabled by improper hardware access. The ability to escalate privileges from a guest VM to the host represents a classic virtualization escape scenario, which is among the most critical risks in cloud computing and desktop-as-a-service deployments where trust boundaries are paramount for security compliance.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching of the NVIDIA vGPU software on all affected Windows and Linux hosts. Administrators should verify that their systems are running versions of the driver that include fixes for this specific access control flaw, as vendor updates typically address such kernel-level permission errors by tightening input validation routines and enforcing stricter resource ownership checks. In environments where immediate patching is not feasible due to operational constraints, network segmentation can provide a partial mitigation layer by restricting communication between virtual machines and ensuring they cannot easily exchange malicious payloads designed to trigger the exploit. Additionally, enabling hardware-assisted virtualization features such as Intel VT-d or AMD-Vi with IOMMU enabled ensures that DMA attacks are mitigated at the chipset level, although this does not fully replace the need for software-level fixes within the driver itself. Regular auditing of guest-to-host communication patterns and monitoring for anomalous GPU resource usage can also aid in early detection of exploitation attempts before significant damage occurs.