CVE-2026-48074 in Appointment Booking
Summary
by MITRE • 08/07/2026
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, when a TENANT_ADMIN deletes an existing staff user, the underlying `StaffService.deleteStaffMember()` runs an additional invite cleanup that deletes from the central `user_invite` table by email. The `email` clause has no `tenantId` predicate. Any pending invite in any tenant that shares the deleted staff's email is removed. A TENANT_ADMIN of tenant A who deletes a staff record with email `victim[@]example[.]com` also deletes the pending invite for `victim[@]example[.]com` in tenant B, even though they have no relationship to tenant B. The user-side delete is correctly scoped (`eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)`), and the pending-invite-only delete path (when `staffId` is itself an invite ID) is also tenant-scoped. The bug is specifically in the invite cleanup that runs as a side effect of deleting an existing staff user. Version 1.0.6 patches the issue.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/07/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical authorization bypass flaw in OpenReception's appointment booking platform that stems from improper database query scoping during staff member deletion operations. The issue occurs when a tenant administrator attempts to remove an existing staff member from their organization, triggering an unintended side effect that affects data belonging to other tenants. The root cause lies in the `StaffService.deleteStaffMember()` method which executes additional cleanup operations beyond the primary staff record removal. While the main deletion operation correctly applies tenant scoping through the `eq(user.id, staffId), eq(user.tenantId, tenantId)` predicate, the subsequent invite cleanup process fails to apply similar restrictions when targeting the central `user_invite` table.
The technical flaw manifests in the invite cleanup logic where the system deletes pending invitations from the centralized `user_invite` table using only an email-based condition without incorporating tenant identification. This design oversight creates a cross-tenant data exposure scenario where administrative actions in one tenant can inadvertently affect users in unrelated tenants sharing identical email addresses. The vulnerability specifically impacts scenarios where a tenant administrator with legitimate access rights performs staff deletion operations, but the side effect of invite cleanup extends beyond intended boundaries. This represents a classic case of insufficient authorization checking and improper database query construction that violates fundamental security principles of multi-tenancy isolation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it allows unauthorized data manipulation across tenant boundaries through seemingly legitimate administrative functions. A malicious or negligent administrator in one tenant could potentially disrupt service for users in another tenant by deleting their pending invitations, effectively blocking legitimate access to the platform. This creates a scenario where tenant administrators inadvertently gain unauthorized access to modify data belonging to other organizations, undermining the core security model of the multi-tenant architecture. The vulnerability essentially enables a form of cross-tenant privilege escalation where administrative actions in one context affect data integrity and availability in unrelated contexts.
This issue aligns with CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User Impersonation and represents a violation of the principle of least privilege in multi-tenant environments. From an ATT&CK perspective, this vulnerability maps to T1531: Account Access Removal and T1078: Valid Accounts, as it enables unauthorized deletion of user invitation records that could disrupt legitimate user access patterns. The vulnerability also demonstrates characteristics of T1496: Resource Hijacking, where system resources intended for one tenant are inadvertently affected by operations performed in another tenant context. The fix implemented in version 1.0.6 addresses the specific query scoping issue by ensuring that the invite cleanup operation properly incorporates tenant identification parameters, thereby maintaining proper isolation between multi-tenant data stores.
The security implications extend beyond immediate data integrity concerns to include potential service disruption and user experience degradation across affected tenants. When a legitimate tenant administrator deletes a staff member, they should only affect their own organization's data, not the broader platform ecosystem. This type of cross-tenant contamination can lead to cascading effects where legitimate users lose access to invitation-based services, potentially affecting business operations and customer satisfaction. The vulnerability also creates audit trail complications where administrative actions appear to affect only one tenant while actually impacting multiple organizations, making security monitoring and incident response more challenging. Proper implementation of tenant scoping in database operations is essential for maintaining the security boundaries that protect individual organizational data within shared infrastructure environments.
The remediation approach taken by OpenReception demonstrates proper vulnerability management through targeted code modification rather than architectural overhauls. The patch ensures that all database operations involving tenant-specific data maintain consistent scoping criteria, preventing unauthorized cross-tenant access patterns. This represents a standard security fix pattern where the specific logical flaw in query construction is addressed without disrupting core platform functionality. The solution reinforces proper multi-tenancy design principles and demonstrates the importance of thorough security review processes for administrative functions that involve side effects or cascading operations. Organizations should implement similar validation checks for all administrative operations that may trigger secondary data modifications to prevent similar cross-tenant contamination scenarios in their own systems.
This vulnerability serves as a reminder of the critical importance of proper query scoping in multi-tenant applications and highlights how seemingly simple administrative functions can create complex security implications when not properly secured. The issue demonstrates that even well-intentioned security measures like end-to-end encryption do not protect against logical flaws in application design, particularly those involving cross-tenant data access patterns. Organizations should conduct regular security reviews of administrative operations, paying special attention to cascading effects and side operations that may inadvertently affect data outside the intended scope. The proper implementation of tenant scoping throughout all database interactions, including cleanup operations, is fundamental to maintaining secure multi-tenant architectures and preventing unauthorized data exposure across organizational boundaries.