CVE-2026-49881 in Android
Summary
by MITRE • 09/08/2026
In serviceClassExists of InCallController.java, there is a possible arbitrary code execution due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/08/2026
The vulnerability identified within the InCallController.java component specifically affects the serviceClassExists method, representing a critical logic flaw that facilitates arbitrary code execution on affected Android-based devices. This issue stems from an improper validation or handling of class references during the initialization or invocation of telephony-related services. The core technical deficiency lies in how the system resolves and instantiates classes associated with incoming call management functions. When the serviceClassExists method is invoked, it fails to adequately verify that the target class belongs to a trusted package or adheres to expected security constraints before proceeding with instantiation or reflection-based operations. This lack of rigorous input validation allows an attacker to manipulate the class resolution process, potentially directing the system to load and execute maliciously crafted classes instead of legitimate framework components.
From a technical perspective, this logic error enables local privilege escalation by allowing unprivileged applications to interact with higher-privilege telephony services in unintended ways. Since the vulnerability does not require user interaction for exploitation, it can be triggered automatically when specific conditions are met, such as the arrival of an incoming call or the initiation of a background service check. The absence of required execution privileges means that any application installed on the device with minimal permissions could potentially exploit this flaw to gain elevated system access. This is particularly dangerous in mobile environments where apps often operate under sandboxed restrictions; bypassing these sandboxes through logic errors in core framework components effectively neutralizes many standard security mitigations designed to isolate applications from each other and from critical system resources.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple code execution, as it compromises the integrity of the telephony subsystem which is central to device communication capabilities. An attacker leveraging this flaw could potentially intercept calls, manipulate call routing data, or install persistent malware that operates with higher privileges than standard applications. This level of access allows for comprehensive surveillance, data exfiltration, and further lateral movement within the device ecosystem. The fact that user interaction is not required significantly lowers the barrier to entry for attackers, enabling silent exploitation in scenarios where users might be unaware they are under attack, such as during routine phone usage or when receiving unsolicited communications from malicious sources.
In terms of industry standards classification, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection) and CWE-20 Improper Input Validation. The logic error in serviceClassExists represents a failure to ensure that the input used for class resolution is both valid and expected by the system architecture. Furthermore, from an offensive security perspective as defined by MITRE ATT&CK, this exploit technique relates to T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter or potentially T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution if it involves triggering a payload through user-facing interfaces like incoming calls. The ability to escalate privileges locally without additional execution privileges places it in the category of critical framework vulnerabilities that undermine the foundational trust model of the operating system.
Mitigation strategies must focus on hardening the InCallController logic and enforcing stricter security boundaries around class loading mechanisms. Developers should implement explicit allow-listing for classes permitted during service resolution, ensuring that only known-safe telephony components can be instantiated through this method. Input validation routines need to be strengthened to verify package signatures and class origins before any reflective operations are performed. Additionally, implementing runtime checks using Android's permission model more rigorously can prevent lower-privileged apps from triggering these code paths unless explicitly authorized by the system or user. Patching involves updating the InCallController.java source file to correct the logic error in serviceClassExists, ensuring that class existence checks do not inadvertently expose execution pathways for untrusted inputs. Regular security audits of telephony framework components are essential to identify similar logical flaws before they can be exploited in production environments.