CVE-2026-49906 in Android
Summary
by MITRE • 11/02/2026
An unprivileged application can bypass the `android.car.permission.CAR_DISPLAY_IN_CLUSTER` permission by registering an activity with the `android.car.cluster.NAVIGATION` category and requesting navigation app focus. The privileged `ClusterHomeSample` application, acting as a confused deputy, resolves and launches this arbitrary third-party activity on the safety-critical instrument cluster display without enforcing the necessary permission check, allowing for persistent display of potentially misleading or distracting content.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/02/2026
The vulnerability described involves a critical security flaw within the Android Automotive OS framework, specifically concerning the interaction between unprivileged applications and the vehicle's instrument cluster interface. The core issue stems from an improper enforcement of access controls by a privileged system component known as ClusterHomeSample. This application holds elevated privileges required to manage display output on the safety-critical instrument cluster but fails to validate whether incoming requests for navigation focus originate from authorized sources. By registering an activity with the android.car.cluster.NAVIGATION category, any unprivileged third-party application can exploit this logic error to trick the privileged component into launching their arbitrary interface on the driver's primary visual display area. This represents a classic confused deputy scenario where a trusted program is manipulated by an attacker-controlled input to perform unauthorized actions that exceed its intended scope of operation.
From a technical perspective, the flaw lies in the absence of permission verification during the resolution and launch process for navigation app focus requests. The android.car.permission.CAR_DISPLAY_IN_CLUSTER permission is designed specifically to restrict which applications can render content on the instrument cluster due to safety implications. However, because ClusterHomeSample acts as an intermediary that resolves these intents without checking if the requesting application possesses this specific permission, it effectively bypasses the operating system's security model. The unprivileged app does not need direct access to the display hardware or framework services; instead, it leverages the privileged status of ClusterHomeSample to achieve its goal. This allows for persistent and potentially misleading content to be displayed on a screen that drivers rely upon for critical vehicle information such as speed, fuel levels, and warning indicators.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the safety-critical nature of the instrument cluster in modern vehicles. Displaying unauthorized or distracting content on the primary driver display can lead to significant cognitive distraction, potentially causing accidents. Furthermore, malicious actors could use this vector to simulate false warnings or hide legitimate alerts by overlaying deceptive interfaces, thereby compromising situational awareness and vehicle control integrity. This type of attack undermines trust in automotive software systems and poses a direct risk to human safety. It also violates fundamental principles of least privilege and separation of duties within embedded operating environments.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management, as the system fails to properly enforce permissions for elevated functions involving display control on critical interfaces. Additionally, it maps to ATT&CK technique T1055 Process Injection or more broadly to privilege escalation vectors where lower-privileged entities manipulate higher-privileged processes to execute unintended code paths. In automotive contexts, such flaws are particularly dangerous because they affect real-time safety systems rather than just data confidentiality. Mitigation strategies must focus on strict validation of permissions before any privileged component acts upon external requests. Developers should implement explicit checks for android.car.permission.CAR_DISPLAY_IN_CLUSTER within ClusterHomeSample prior to resolving or launching navigation activities. Furthermore, adopting a zero-trust architecture where no application is implicitly trusted based solely on category registration would prevent such confused deputy attacks. Regular security audits and static analysis tools focused on intent resolution paths can help identify similar flaws in automotive software stacks before deployment.