CVE-2026-53557 in SQLBot
Summary
by MITRE • 09/18/2026
SQLBot is an intelligent Text-to-SQL system based on large language models and RAG. Prior to 1.9.0, an authenticated user can supply a crafted sheet["tableName"] value in the Excel datasource configuration submitted through POST /api/v1/datasource/, and SQLBot stores that value without safe identifier handling. When the same datasource is later removed through DELETE /api/v1/datasource/{id}, the stored value is interpolated into datasource cleanup SQL and executed by PostgreSQL. This second-order SQL injection can invoke PostgreSQL COPY TO PROGRAM and execute arbitrary operating-system commands with the privileges of the postgres process inside the SQLBot container. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/18/2026
SQLBot represents a modern approach to data interaction, leveraging large language models and retrieval-augmented generation to translate natural language queries into structured query language statements. While this technology offers significant advantages for accessibility and efficiency in database management, it introduces complex attack surfaces that require rigorous security controls. The vulnerability identified within versions prior to 1.9.0 highlights a critical failure in input validation and sanitization mechanisms during the configuration of external data sources. Specifically, the system fails to properly handle identifiers when processing Excel datasource configurations submitted via the POST /api/v1/datasource/ endpoint. This flaw allows an authenticated user to inject malicious payloads by crafting specific values for the sheet["tableName"] parameter, which are then stored in the database without adequate escaping or validation of special characters that hold syntactic significance within SQL commands.
The severity of this vulnerability is amplified by its nature as a second-order SQL injection. Unlike first-order injections where exploitation occurs immediately upon input submission, this flaw remains dormant until a subsequent action triggers the execution of the maliciously stored data. In this scenario, the trigger event is the deletion of the datasource through the DELETE /api/v1/datasource/{id} endpoint. When the system attempts to clean up resources associated with the deleted datasource, it interpolates the previously stored tableName value directly into a SQL cleanup statement without safe identifier handling. This interpolation process fails to distinguish between data and executable code, allowing the injected payload to be interpreted as part of the SQL command structure by the PostgreSQL database engine.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, leading to remote code execution with the privileges of the postgres user within the SQLBot container environment. By exploiting the second-order injection, an attacker can manipulate the cleanup query to invoke the PostgreSQL COPY TO PROGRAM functionality. This feature allows the database server to execute operating system commands on behalf of the database process. Consequently, an authenticated attacker can achieve arbitrary command execution, potentially leading to full compromise of the underlying host system, lateral movement within the network, and access to sensitive data stored in adjacent systems or containers. The ability to escalate from a simple configuration error to complete system control underscores the critical nature of proper input sanitization even for values that are not immediately executed upon entry.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-89, which covers Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, commonly known as SQL Injection. The specific mechanism involving stored data being later exploited fits the profile of Second-Order SQL Injection, often categorized under CWE-964 or implicitly within broader injection categories depending on the taxonomy version. In terms of adversarial tactics, this exploitation path corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1059, Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically through database command execution via COPY TO PROGRAM. It also relates to privilege escalation vectors where an attacker leverages existing application permissions to execute code at a higher system level than intended by the security architecture.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary fix involves upgrading SQLBot to version 1.9.0 or later, which addresses this specific flaw through improved input validation and safe identifier handling. For environments where an upgrade is not immediately feasible, defensive measures should include implementing strict allow-listing for table names and datasource identifiers to ensure only alphanumeric characters and underscores are accepted. Additionally, deploying a Web Application Firewall with rules capable of detecting SQL injection patterns in POST request bodies can provide a layer of defense against exploitation attempts. It is also critical to enforce the principle of least privilege by ensuring that the database user account used by the application does not possess elevated permissions such as the ability to execute system commands via COPY TO PROGRAM, thereby limiting the blast radius even if an injection occurs. Regular security audits and static code analysis focused on SQL query construction practices are essential to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future development cycles.