CVE-2026-53556 in SQLBot
Summary
by MITRE • 09/18/2026
SQLBot is an intelligent Text-to-SQL system based on large language models and RAG. Prior to 1.9.0, the POST /api/v1/datasource/previewData endpoint in backend/apps/datasource/crud/datasource.py incorporates the client-controlled table_name value into generated SQL without safe identifier handling. An authenticated user can configure a datasource for SQLBot's internal PostgreSQL service and submit a crafted table_name that remains a SELECT operation under the read-only policy while invoking pg_read_file(), pg_read_binary_file(), or pg_ls_dir(). In the default tested trusted loopback authentication configuration, the internal connection accepts invalid credentials and executes with PostgreSQL superuser privileges, allowing filesystem content such as /etc/hosts and /etc/passwd to be returned in the previewData API response and potentially exposing configuration, credentials, authentication secrets, and source code. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/18/2026
SQLBot represents a modern approach to database interaction by leveraging large language models and retrieval-augmented generation to translate natural language queries into SQL statements. However, versions prior to 1.9.0 contain a critical security flaw within the backend datasource preview functionality that undermines the intended read-only constraints of the system. The vulnerability resides in the POST /api/v1/datasource/previewData endpoint located in the source file backend/apps/datasource/crud/datasource.py. This component is responsible for executing sample queries to validate data sources before allowing users to run full reports or analyses against them. In this specific implementation, the system accepts a table_name parameter from the client and incorporates it directly into the generated SQL query without applying safe identifier handling mechanisms such as proper quoting or escaping of special characters.
The core technical flaw is an injection vulnerability that allows for command execution within the database context rather than just data retrieval. Although the application enforces a read-only policy to prevent destructive operations like INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, or DROP, this restriction typically applies only to standard SQL keywords and does not account for PostgreSQL-specific functions that can perform file system operations. By carefully crafting the table_name input, an authenticated user can manipulate the query structure so that it remains syntactically valid as a SELECT statement while simultaneously invoking dangerous built-in functions such as pg_read_file(), pg_read_binary_file(), or pg_ls_dir(). These functions are designed for database administrators to read files from the server's file system and return their contents as text, effectively bypassing the application-level restrictions on data modification.
The severity of this vulnerability is significantly amplified by the default authentication configuration used in many deployments of SQLBot. In a typical setup utilizing trusted loopback authentication, the internal connection between the Python backend and the PostgreSQL database accepts connections even if invalid credentials are provided or omitted entirely. Consequently, when the malicious query is executed, it runs with superuser privileges within the PostgreSQL instance. This elevation of privilege means that the attacker gains unrestricted access to sensitive files on the host operating system where the database resides. The vulnerability allows for the exfiltration of critical configuration files such as /etc/hosts and /etc/passwd, but can extend to any file accessible by the superuser account, including application source code, environment variables containing secrets, SSH keys, and other authentication credentials stored on disk.
From a classification perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-89 for Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, specifically highlighting how input validation failed to prevent the injection of administrative functions through identifier manipulation. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Data from Local System and potentially T1059 if interpreted as part of a broader command execution chain via database stored procedures or functions. The operational impact is severe, leading to full disclosure of sensitive information that can facilitate further attacks such as credential stuffing, lateral movement within the network, or reverse engineering of proprietary application logic.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must upgrade SQLBot to version 1.9.0 or later where the issue has been resolved through improved input sanitization and stricter enforcement of read-only policies at the database driver level rather than relying solely on query parsing heuristics. Additionally, it is recommended to review PostgreSQL authentication configurations to ensure that superuser privileges are not granted via trusted loopback connections for application services unless absolutely necessary. Implementing principle of least privilege by creating dedicated database users with restricted permissions can further limit the blast radius in case of future vulnerabilities. Regular security audits and static code analysis focused on SQL generation practices should be integrated into the development lifecycle to prevent similar injection flaws from being introduced in other components of the system.