CVE-2026-56699 in Wazuh
Summary
by MITRE • 07/15/2026
Wazuh Manager before 5.0.0-beta3 fails to escape the DataValue.index field when constructing OpenSearch bulk requests, allowing enrolled agents to inject arbitrary NDJSON operations. Attackers can smuggle delete, index, or update operations into bulk requests executed under the manager's admin credentials, enabling document deletion, alert tampering, and cross-agent SIEM state manipulation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/15/2026
The vulnerability in Wazuh Manager versions prior to 5.0.0-beta3 represents a critical server-side request forgery issue that stems from inadequate input sanitization within the OpenSearch bulk request construction process. This flaw specifically affects the DataValue.index field handling, where the system fails to properly escape or validate user-supplied data before incorporating it into administrative bulk operations. The vulnerability exists at the intersection of data processing and privilege escalation, creating a pathway for authenticated agents to manipulate the underlying search infrastructure through carefully crafted input sequences.
The technical exploitation mechanism relies on the improper handling of NDJSON (Newline Delimited JSON) operations within bulk request contexts. When enrolled agents submit data that includes maliciously constructed index fields, the Wazuh Manager processes these inputs without adequate sanitization, allowing arbitrary operations to be embedded within legitimate bulk requests. This injection occurs at the point where the system constructs OpenSearch bulk payloads, leveraging the administrative privileges associated with manager operations to execute unauthorized actions. The flaw aligns with CWE-74 and CWE-89 categories related to improper neutralization of special elements used in data queries and injection flaws.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data manipulation to encompass complete SIEM state compromise. Attackers can leverage the injected operations to delete critical documents, modify existing records, or create new entries within the OpenSearch index under the manager's administrative credentials. This capability enables comprehensive alert tampering where security events are altered or removed from the system, potentially masking malicious activities while simultaneously allowing for cross-agent data manipulation that could compromise the integrity of the entire monitoring infrastructure. The implications are particularly severe given that these operations execute with elevated privileges, bypassing normal access controls and authentication mechanisms.
The attack vector demonstrates a sophisticated exploitation pattern that requires agents to be properly enrolled and authenticated within the Wazuh environment, making it difficult to detect through traditional network monitoring. However, the vulnerability's impact is amplified by its ability to operate silently within legitimate administrative workflows, potentially remaining undetected for extended periods. This characteristic aligns with ATT&CK techniques involving privilege escalation through legitimate credentials and command and control operations that manipulate data persistence mechanisms. Organizations should implement immediate mitigation strategies including upgrading to Wazuh Manager 5.0.0-beta3 or later versions, implementing strict input validation at the manager level, and monitoring for anomalous bulk request patterns that could indicate exploitation attempts.
The vulnerability highlights fundamental security gaps in data processing pipelines where user inputs are not adequately sanitized before being integrated into privileged operations. This type of flaw represents a classic example of how insufficient input validation can create pathways for privilege escalation through indirect means, particularly within complex security infrastructure environments where administrative credentials are required to maintain system integrity. The remediation approach must address both the immediate code-level fix and broader architectural considerations around input handling in multi-tenant security systems.