CVE-2026-59385 in CAPI
Summary
by MITRE • 10/30/2026
A user with SpaceDeveloper privileges could modify the URL of a space-scoped broker without altering its credentials, enabling extraction of existing broker credentials by redirecting them to a broker under their control. The CF API does not permit direct reading of broker credentials, making this an indirect extraction method.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/30/2026
The vulnerability described represents a critical authorization bypass within the Cloud Foundry platform, specifically affecting components that manage service brokers with space-scoped configurations. This flaw allows a user possessing SpaceDeveloper privileges to manipulate the configuration of existing service brokers in ways that were not originally intended by the system's security model. While standard access controls prevent direct reading of sensitive broker credentials through the API, this vulnerability exploits an indirect mechanism involving URL redirection to achieve credential exfiltration. The core issue lies in the platform's handling of updates to space-scoped broker objects, where the validation logic fails to adequately restrict which fields can be modified relative to others, creating a pathway for privilege escalation and data theft that circumvents standard authentication checks.
Technically, the flaw stems from an incomplete implementation of access control policies on the Cloud Foundry API endpoints responsible for updating service broker configurations. When a user with SpaceDeveloper privileges attempts to modify a space-scoped broker, they are permitted to change certain attributes such as the URL endpoint while leaving other sensitive fields like credentials unchanged in their current state within the database. However, the system fails to enforce strict separation between these operations during the update process. By redirecting the broker's URL to an endpoint controlled by the attacker, the platform may inadvertently trigger authentication flows or logging mechanisms that expose the existing credentials associated with that broker. This indirect extraction method bypasses the API restriction designed to prevent direct credential retrieval, effectively turning a configuration management feature into a vector for sensitive data leakage.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it compromises the confidentiality and integrity of service integrations within multi-tenant Cloud Foundry deployments. Service brokers often connect to backend systems containing proprietary or regulated data, and their credentials serve as the primary authentication mechanism for these connections. If an attacker can extract these credentials, they gain unauthorized access to the underlying services, potentially leading to further compromise of application data, lateral movement across network segments, or disruption of critical business functions. In a multi-tenant environment, this could allow one tenant's developer to spy on another tenant's service configurations if proper isolation is not strictly enforced at the broker level, undermining the fundamental security boundaries of the platform.
Mitigation strategies must focus on tightening access control checks and enhancing input validation within the Cloud Foundry API layer. Developers should implement strict field-level authorization checks that ensure modifications to non-sensitive fields like URLs do not inadvertently trigger side effects related to sensitive fields unless explicitly authorized by higher-privilege roles such as SpaceAdmin or OrgManager. Additionally, implementing additional verification steps during broker updates, such as requiring re-authentication for credential-related operations even if credentials are not being directly changed, can help prevent exploitation. Regular auditing of API usage patterns and monitoring for unusual redirection activities to external domains controlled by unknown entities will also aid in early detection. Upgrading to patched versions of Cloud Foundry that address this specific authorization bypass is the most effective immediate remediation step.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-269, which describes Improper Privilege Management, as it involves a user exercising permissions beyond their intended scope through an indirect path. It also relates to CWE-732, concerning Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource, because the system incorrectly assigns write access that leads to read access of protected data. From an ATT&CK perspective, this behavior maps to T1530, Data from Cloud Storage Object or Service Account, as it involves exfiltrating credentials used by a service account (the broker) rather than a human user directly. Understanding these mappings helps in categorizing the risk and applying appropriate defensive controls consistent with industry best practices for cloud-native security architectures.